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Abstract 
Introduction. Medical requirements for the future Crew Exploration Vehicle 
(CEV), Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM), advanced Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA) suits and Lunar habitat are currently being developed. Crews returning to 
the lunar surface will construct the lunar habitat and conduct scientific research. 
Inherent in aggressive surface activities is the potential risk of injury to 
crewmembers. Physiological responses and the operational environment for 
short forays during the Apollo lunar missions were studied and documented. 
Little is known about the operational environment in which crews will live and 
work and the hardware will be used for long-duration lunar surface 
operations.Additional informantion is needed regarding productivity and the 
events that affect crew function such as a compressed timeline. The Space 
Medicine Division at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) requested a study 
in December 2005 to identify Apollo mission issues relevant to medical 
operations that had impact to crew health and/or performance. The operationally 
oriented goals of this project were to develop or modify medical requirements for 
new exploration vehicles and habitats, create a centralized database for future 
access, and share relevant Apollo information with the multiple entities at NASA 
and abroad participating in the exploration effort. 
 
Methods. A review of  medical operations during Apollo missions 7 through 17 
was conducted. Ten categories of hardware, systems, or crew factors were 
identified during preliminary data review generating 655 data records which were 
captured in an Access® database. The preliminary review resulted in 280 
questions which were posed to surviving Apollo crewmembers using mail, face-
to-face meetings, phone communications, or online interactions. Crew member 
responses to these questions formed the basis for recommendations to items in 
each of the categories. 
 
Results. 14 of 22 surviving Apollo astronauts (64%) participated in the project. 
Approximately 236 pages of responses to the questions were generated based 
on the Apollo experiences, with 107 recommendations offered for future vehicles, 
habitats, EVA suits, and lunar surface operations.  
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Discussion. The Apollo medical operations recommendations are being 
incorporated into the exploration mission architecture at various levels: 49 
recommendations either validated, revised or created new requirements, 4 are 
currently in practice, 15 are being evaluated, and 44 are being considered.  A 
centralized database has been developed, and the recommendations have been 
presented to the different organizations involved with building the new vehicles, 
habitats, suits, or systems that may impact crew health and performance. 
 
Conclusions. The Apollo crewmembers’ input has proved to be an invaluable 
resource to a multitude of departments beyond space medicine. We will continue 
soliciting input from this group as we evolve and refine requirements for future 
exploration missions.  
 
Introduction 
 
The Apollo program, which began in January of 1966, was comprised of 18 
missions: 12 crewed missions (including the Apollo 204 mission with Virgil “Gus” 
Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee) and six uncrewed missions which tested 
the capabilities of the Saturn rocket components6. The Apollo 7 mission heralded 
the first successful crewed mission, and in July of 1969, Apollo 11 fulfilled John 
F. Kennedy’s mandate to send a man to the Moon and return him safely home7. 
Twenty-six men flew Apollo missions, including four repeat flyers. Of the manned 
missions, six flights conducted between July 1969 and December 1972 
successfully landed 12 humans on the lunar surface and returned them to the 
Earth. 
 
In January 2004, President George W. Bush committed the United States to the 
further exploration of space8. This new vision for space exploration has the 
benefit of the cumulative knowledge and experience gained from the Apollo 
program. The exploration effort will require the development of new vehicles to 
transport crews from Earth to the lunar surface and for transportation while on 
the moon. In addition, crew will need extravehicular activity (EVA) suits and 
extended duration habitation elements for the lunar surface operations10. The 
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) 
though slightly larger, will bear many similarities to the Apollo Command Module 
(CM) and Lunar Module (LM). The EVA suits may serve the dual function of a 
launch and entry suit as well as the lunar surface suit. Lunar habitation is a new 
frontier, enabling humans to live on the Moon for extended periods in order to 
conduct science experiments and use the lunar environment for in-situ resource 
utilization (ISRU). 
 
During previous studies, Apollo astronauts provided input into the engineering 
and mechanical aspects of EVA suit system designs 2. However, no study has 
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specifically addressed the impact of the Apollo vehicles, hardware, and systems 
on crew health or performance throughout all mission phases, including lunar 
surface operations and the influence of that impact on the new exploration 
vehicles and mission architectures. 
 
To identify Apollo mission issues that had impact to crew health and/or 
performance and were relevant to medical operations, the Space Medicine 
Division requested a study in December of 2005. The goals of this project were 
to develop or modify medical requirements for new vehicles and habitats, create 
a centralized medical operations database for future access, and provide this 
knowledge to the multiple directorates at NASA-JSC participating in the 
exploration effort. Secondary objectives included using this information to 
validate current requirements and refresh knowledge regarding lunar operations 
in an effort to reduce both programmatic risk and risk to crew health, productivity, 
and safety. The Space Medicine Division study and this paper are not intended to 
be a review of information contained in previous publications, such as Biomedical 
Results of Apollo. 
 
Due to the multidisciplinary operational focus of this study, the primary audience 
targeted is diverse. The audience includes flight surgeons, engineers, and 
scientists developing the medical requirements for exploration vehicles, habitats, 
and suits, the mission planners developing crew timelines, and experts 
supporting behavioral health and performance. Various aspects of this report will 
be of interest to a broader readership outside the medical operations community. 
Therefore, the report is written in a medically non-attributable format accessible 
to anyone with an interest in the Apollo program. 
 
The Apollo Medical Operations Project was headed by Rick Scheuring, DO, MS, 
UTMB/Wyle Labs flight surgeon, James D. Polk, DO, MS, Manager of Medical 
Operations at JSC and Josef Schmid, MD, also with Medical Operations at JSC. 
The team included other flight surgeons from the Medical Operations office at 
JSC and University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, as well as project 
scientists and engineers within the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) and 
the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at JSC. Participation of the Apollo 
astronauts was solicited through the Medical Operations Division.The team 
would like to express an acknowledgement of the enormity of the task and an 
appreciation to the Apollo crews for discussing their missions which occurred at a 
time when most of the team members were still children. 
 
Methods 
 
This section addresses the spectrum of approaches taken to assimilate, 
categorize, and assess the data. 
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Background Research 
 
Background research was undertaken by the Apollo Medical Operations Project 
team to maximize the benefits from the study. The approach taken in this study 
consisted of the following:  
• Identify specific medical-related problems, if any, in each area associated 
with the operational environment during all mission phases 
• Define the impact on crew health and/or performance 
• Identify problems that recurred or were fixed on subsequent missions 
• Develop an integrated, comprehensive set of questions that could be used 
in a face-to-face meetings with the Apollo astronauts  
The impetus to take these steps to “do our homework” before meeting with the 
astronauts came from the Apollo crewmembers themselves11. The crews voiced 
annoyance at discussing subjects or responding to questions that previously had 
been published. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the team to research areas 
and develop questions not previously documented. 
 
Review of Apollo resources pertaining to Medical Operations and the sources of 
data included: Apollo 7-17 medical mission debriefs; Apollo 7-17 flight surgeon 
logs; Apollo 7-17 biomedical engineer logs; Apollo 7-17 mission commentaries; 
Apollo mission reports (11-17)13; Apollo lunar surface journals (11-17)3; 
preliminary science reports (11-17)12; the Apollo lecture series11; Apollo videos; 
NASA technical memorandums, related papers2,14,15,16,17,18; and personal 
communications with the crewmembers through email, phone or direct contact. 
These materials were reviewed by the team to understand the Apollo astronauts’ 
experiences and the issues impacting their health and/or performance as 
previously reported. It is important to note that the medical debriefs and flight 
surgeon/BME logs are considered medically confidential material and subject to 
the Medical Privacy Act of 1974. All other resources are available to the public. It 
is equally important to note that some issues identified in the debriefs were 
detailed in the crew logs, crew questionnaires, or air-to-ground communications 
but were unavailable. Every attempt was made to fill in the missing information 
from available resources for this study. 
 
After reviewing historical data, the team identified eleven categories within the 
operational environment occurring during Apollo 7-17 that had impacts to crew 
health and/or performance. The data assembled into these categories formed the 
basis of the questions used to interview the Apollo astronauts. The categories 
included EVA mobility unit (EMU) and EVA suit issues; lunar surface operations; 
inflight illnesses, medical kit, medications, or bioinstrumentation; environmental 
(vehicle); radiation; exercise; food and nutrition; performance, human factors, 
crew schedule; launch, re-entry, and recovery; and flight surgeon-crew 
interactions. Certain well-documented areas relating to crew health or 
performance, such as lunar dust, were identified but not covered in detail during 
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this study. Likewise, areas that affected the Apollo crews but were not relevant to 
the new vehicle design, such as the Apollo water chlorination system, were 
identified in the data collection but were not addressed during the face-to-face 
meetings. 
 
Data Collection 
 
The historical data collected was organized and compiled into an Access® 
database (Appendix A). This database facilitated the search capabilities of the 
team in identifying areas that had health and/or performance impacts. The data 
was organized by mission, source of information, topic (category), 
medical/hardware issue, crewmember involved (if applicable), description of the 
problem, general comments about the issue, and resolution/reoccurrence. From 
this body of data questions related to the issue were generated. The team used 
this method, to create 655 data records. An example of one record is provided in 
figure 1. Note that any attributable astronaut medical information contained in 
Appendix A has been removed for the purpose of this paper and exists as a 
separate document. 
 
 
Figure 1. Sample Access® data record from the Apollo Medical Operations Project. 
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Panel Questions 
 
Questions were generated within the 11 categories from the historical data 
search effort and input from operational and research disciplines associated with 
each category (Appendix B). These questions were augmented with others 
impacting crew health or performance solicited from discipline leads in each 
category. The categorized questions were reviewed by flight surgeons and 
current astronaut physicians at JSC for relevance and operational applicability to 
the exploration effort. This resulted in a final list of 280 questions used during the 
face-to-face meeting with the Apollo astronauts. 
 
Face-to-Face Summit 
 
The face-to-face summit with the Apollo astronauts was held June 2006 in 
Houston, Texas. Per the crewmembers’ request, days 1 & 2 were closed 
sessions limited to Apollo crew, the current flight surgeon cadre, and astronaut 
physicians. Day 3 was limited to invited guests and the Apollo flight surgeons. Of 
the original 29 Apollo astronauts, 22 survive today and were invited to participate 
in the face-to-face summit (Appendix E). Dr. Joseph Kerwin, who served as 
CAPCOM for Apollo 13 and astronaut physician on Skylab I, was a project team 
member and invited to participate as an astronaut. The invited guests for Day 3 
submitted questions to the Apollo Medical Operations Project team prior to the 
meeting to insure the appropriateness of the question and to facilitate interaction 
with the crewmembers during the session. 
 
Prior to the panel question discussion on days 1 and 2, the project team 
presented informational briefings to achieve the intended outcome of the 
meeting. The two-fold purpose of the meetings was to capture the experiences of 
the Apollo astronauts to validate findings from the historical data search and to 
project applicable aspects of Apollo operational experience to the exploration 
initiative. The project team presented the issues that faced the crews during their 
missions from the historical data research to increase their awareness of the 
current knowledge base. It also served to stimulate memories garnered three and 
a half decades ago. The presentation concluded with a discussion of the 
exploration architecture to familiarize the participants with the new strategies and 
mission plans. 
 
The panel discussions were held with the astronauts and project team members 
meeting in one room. A professional transcriptionist recorded all comments from 
the astronauts and later organized the responses with the corresponding 
questions. The day-3 session was conducted in a similar manner by the team 
and transcriptionist. This document was then reviewed by the project team for 
accuracy and clarification. Notes taken by the panel team during the question 
sessions were added to the document as necessary. 
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Post-Summit Review and Validation 
 
The purpose of the post-summit phase was to compile the accumulated 
responses to the panel questions and organize into a comprehensive report 
(Appendix B). Apollo astronauts who participated in the face-to-face summit 
reviewed and validated the report. They also submitted additional input and 
points of clarification. After review by the project team, the updated version 
including recommendations was then submitted to all the Apollo astronauts 
providing an opportunity for an additional six crewmembers not attending the 
face-to-face meetings to participate. Responses can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Results 
 
Data 
 
Sixty-four percent (14 of 22) of the surviving Apollo astronauts participated in the 
project. The combined crewmember responses to the 280 questions generated 
from the background research resulted in 236 pages of data. A comprehensive 
review of all the responses from the astronaut sources revealed 107 
recommendations from statements in all 11 categories that the group made to 
the questions as shown in Appendix C. The input shown in table 1 formed the 
basis of the Apollo Medical Operations Project recommendations. 
 
Number of attendees 8 
Post-summit full responses 7 
Total number of Apollo astronauts 
input 
14 
Number of Apollo astronauts 
available 
22 
Table 1. Astronaut attendance and participation at Apollo Summit. 
 
The panel discussion questions and answers document is broken down into the 
number of questions per category and the responses from the post-summit 
participants in Table 2. Note that this section is only post-summit responses and 
does not include the eight summit attendees’ responses, which could not be 
individualized. 
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Input from 14 of 22 astronauts 
(summit and post-summit) 
64%     
 # of 
Questions 
Post-Summit  
# of Responses 
Post-Summit 
Response Rate % 
EMU/EVA Suit 63 30 8.06% 
Lunar Surface Ops 36 20 9.26% 
In-flight Illnesses/Medications 16 24 25.00% 
Medical Kit 3 4 22.00% 
Bioinstrumentation 3 5 27.78% 
Environmental Impacts 35 75 35.71% 
Radiation 5 4 13.33% 
Exercise 20 33 27.50% 
Food Nutrition 28 76 45.24% 
Performance/Human Factors 16 48 50.00% 
Crew Work-Rest Schedules 10 30 50.00% 
Launch Recovery 34 121 59.31% 
Flight Surgeon Crew Interaction 2 7 58.33% 
General Questions 14 31 36.90% 
Totals 285 508   
Table 2. Number of questions in each of the 11 categories with number and rate of post-summit 
participant responses. Note that the number of categories is further broken down into subsections 
of the main category where bolded.  
 
Operational and Research Recommendations by 
Category 
 
EMU/EVA Suit 
 
1. Improve glove flexibility, dexterity, fit. According to the Apollo lunar crews, 
the most fatiguing part of surface EVA tasks was repetitive gripping. Regarding 
the glove, one crewmember stated, “Efficiency was no more than 10% of the use 
of the hand.” The fingernails tended to be pulled back resulting in separation of 
the nail from the bed, or onycholysis. Additionally, the skin frequently was 
abraded from the top of the knuckles. This event took on operational and 
potentially mission significance as several lunar walkers stated that they would 
not be able to work in the glove beyond the two-three EVA’s they completed due 
to the swelling and pain over the bony prominences of the metacarpal phalangeal 
(MCP) and proximal interphalangeal (PIP) joints. It is also interesting to note that 
the lunar crews stated that they did not experience hand or forearm trauma in 
training, though muscle fatigue occurred. This was not their experience on the 
moon. In terms of flexibility and fit, the glove should come as close to Earth-
normal dexterity and use of the hands as possible. Lowering the pressure [in the 
suit] was suggested, i.e. the less strength it takes to manipulate the glove, the 
less physically tasking to the hand and forearm musculature. This can also be 
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accomplished by reducing the glove bulk by making the bladder thinner. Other 
glove recommendations included: 
• Gloves should be custom designed for each crewmember and should 
incorporate mechanical closure for gripping 
• Designers should consider a wrist seal and depressurized glove 
• Robotic power-assisted glove should be used for repetitive tasks 
• Glove liners should be worn to prevent skin chaffing and abrasions 
 
A consensus statement made by the Apollo astronauts who participated in the 
project on the EVA suit issue was that given a fixed budget for suit development 
and improvement, the funding for the new suit would be best spent in improving 
the glove. If money is left over for other components, then address those issues, 
but fix the glove first. 
 
2. Reduce the mass of the suit by a factor of two. Once the glove issues have 
been addressed, reducing the suit mass would help. Despite suit bulkiness, the 
astronauts cautioned that suit mass were an asset to some extent in the partial 
gravity environment. It provided an inertial point of reference that allowed them to 
adapt to 1/6 g. Reducing the suit mass too much would remove the familiarity the 
crewmembers relied on and may predispose one to injury. 
 
3. Increase general mobility by a factor of four. EVA suit mobility was more of 
an issue in terms of surface locomotion and energy expenditure. The crews often 
felt they were fighting the resistance in the suit (particularly in the glove). This 
was fatiguing, especially in the thighs. The astronauts pointed out that the lunar 
surface is likened to an ocean more than a desert. The undulating surface posed 
a number of challenges, including ambulating against a suit that did not allow 
mobility at the hip. Normal human locomotion includes flexion at the hip and the 
Apollo A7LB did not allow this motion. The crewmember had to bend forward 
from the knee joint, which demanded considerably more work load on the 
quadriceps muscles. Therefore, the mobility recommendations centered on 
adding hip mobility and improved knee flexibility. One comment summed this 
point well, “Bending the knee was difficult in the suit. We need a better [more 
flexible] knee joint.” 
 
Reducing suit pressure would accomplish this to some extent but the crews 
understood the limitations with using this approach to improving suit mobility 
alone, namely increasing decompression sickness risk and reducing the margin 
of safety with a suit puncture. It was also pointed out that lowering suit pressure 
may remove some of the suit extremity splinting effect and could predispose to 
limb injury, which was generally not a concern at the Apollo suit pressure. 
 
4. Lower suit Center of Gravity (CG). Although this area has garnered 
considerable attention recently with new suit design, the crews felt it was not a 
main issue, compared to the glove issues or suit mobility. They reported adapting 
to the suit CG quickly on the lunar surface, which was described as “aft and 
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slightly high.” A number of crewmembers stated “Don’t make moving the CG your 
primary priority. Move the CG only if it becomes convenient to do so while taking 
care of other issues like reducing the mass of the suit, fixing the glove, etc.” 
 
5. Develop a system that prevents helmet fogging during heavy exertion. 
Although the lunar walkers did not experience fogging of their visor while on the 
Moon, its occurrence could be catastrophic. An example for potential adverse 
effects due to visor fogging was the Apollo 11 mission. Crewmembers remained 
in their suits during recovery operations for quarantine concerns. The visor 
fogged once the command module (CM) was opened to the humid, warm South 
Pacific air, completely obscuring their vision. One crewmember became very 
concerned during transfer from the CM to the rescue basket, as he was unable to 
clear the visor to see where he was going. The implications on the lunar surface 
are obvious. Visor fogging needs to be eliminated as a concern, especially if a 
contingency situation occurs where the crewmember is physically exerting 
him/herself for extended periods of time. 
 
6. Improve peripheral vision by adding neck ring (movable joint). The 
surface crewmembers stated, “You would always have to turn your body [and the 
suit] to see to the side.” The astronauts’ inability to see their feet during lunar 
operations made walking difficult at times. Helmet design should allow the 
astronauts to see their feet while traversing the surface of the moon. Another 
participant concern was the inability to see their arm during a fall to the side, 
which occurred with some frequency. A movable neck ring, such as the Navy 
deep sea diving helmet with rotating neck ring, is a good option and should be 
considered in the new suit design. 
 
7. Develop a reliable Heads-up Display (HUD) displaying consumables 
information, limited biomedical (BIOMED) data, and navigation on demand. 
The crews felt the HUD should primarily present the operational information that 
you need in an instant, e.g. if you want to see oxygen consumption, you say 
“oxygen” and it appears on the display. Crew did not feel a pressing need to 
know their heart rate, metabolic rate, or other physiological information during an 
EVA as in a continuous display. However, a heads-up display would be 
acceptable with limited physiological information on demand. A concern 
expressed by one participant was to avoid increasing the complexity of the 
system to the point of reducing its reliability. 
 
8. The lunar boot functioned well and does not need to be improved.  
The boot was very comfortable; however, it was slippery on rocks or boulders 
that had high silica content. This was not a problem generally during the surface 
operations. Concerns regarding “slipping” in the moon dirt were unfounded. The 
lunar regolith has a high coefficient of friction. This property helped maintain the 
crewmembers footing despite its “slippery” or “loose” appearance. There was not 
concern about ankle sprains or injuries with falls due to the lunar soil. 
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9. Use a self-sealing pressure garment within the suit in case of puncture. 
EVA suit puncture hazard was the primary concern of the lunar astronauts, 
although the risk was considered low. Astronauts suggested that protecting suit 
occupants from a break in suit integrity was for future research and development 
activities. 
 
10. The drink bag should have capability to contain a high-energy liquid in 
addition to plain water. The A7LB suit had a 15-ounce drink bag, an amount 
considered insufficient for the crews on the surface. Typical lunar surface 
activities may last up to 7.5 hours, but the total time in-suit from don-to-doff could 
be up to 10 hours. The astronauts strongly agreed the amount of liquid beverage 
contained in the suit needed to be increased for future crewmembers, including 
separate capabilities for plain water and a non-caffeinated high-energy drink. 
Caffeine causes the micturition reflex and could potentially cause dehydration 
from frequent urination. 
 
11. Develop a better in-suit Urine Collection Device (UCD) that will work in 
1/6 g. The UCD provided to the crewmembers for use in the suit was a one-size-
fits-all device that worked for some and did not work for others. Urine leaks 
sometimes resulted in skin irritation. 
 
12. The suit should be a low pressure (3.50 psia), single gas system. 
Referring to recommendation #3, the crews stated that testing a lower pressure 
suit should be considered but suggested a lower limit pressure of 3.50 psia at 
100% oxygen. 
 
13. Protect the suit zipper function. The Apollo A7LB suit was a single zipper 
system, unlike the Gemini suit which was a double-zipper system. The lunar dust 
was difficult to clear from the zipper and impaired normal function on each 
subsequent lunar EVA. The abrasive nature of the dust scored the metal 
connections. The lunar dust exposure did not result in a breach of the sealing 
capability of the suit; repeated exposures may increase this risk. 
 
Lunar Surface Operations 
 
Among the lunar surface operations recommendations, crew scheduling, 
feasibility of surface activity commencement, airlock and hatch design were given 
particular importance for the exploration architecture. 
 
14. Schedule crews for two Lunar EVA (LEVA) days on and one day for 
maintenance, alternating crews throughout the week. The surface walkers 
were adamant that surgeons protect the future lunar crews from overwork. 
Multiple factors allowed the Apollo lunar crews to work and stay awake for long 
periods of time during their relatively short stay: disruption of normal circadian 
rhythm influencing wake-sleep cycles; loud ambient noise levels in the lunar 
module (LM) (the exact background noise level was not measured according to 
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Jerry Goodman, Apollo vehicle engineer); and crew psychological state, i.e. the 
lunar astronauts were excited considering their current circumstances. Sleep was 
described as a couple of hours of “nodding off” on the lunar surface. The 
astronauts stated that to optimize crew performance for extended stays on the 
Moon, the schedule should never allow for more than two days of LEVA 
consecutively without a day of rest. This day would be considered an 
intravehicular activity (IVA) day spent performing suit maintenance or preparation 
for future field activity. A crew of four could alternate this schedule thereby 
protecting the crewmembers from overwork. 
 
15. The hatch and ingress corridor should be sized appropriately for an 
inflated 1/6 g pressure suit. A curious finding during the background research 
involved reviewing the individual crewmembers metabolic activity during their 
lunar surface activity. All the crewmembers had notable increases in their 
metabolic rate during the last half hour of their 3.5 to 7.5 hour LEVA. The initial 
assumption was that the crews were deconditioned from their micro- and partial 
gravity exposure thereby reducing their exercise capacity. However, the crews’ 
stated sudden increase in energy expenditure had to do with the hatch design on 
the LM: the pressurized suits were too big and bulky to get into the hatch without 
bending and twisting their bodies. The position of the display keyboard (DSKY) 
above the hatch also prevented the crews from placing their hands in this area to 
gain leverage to pull themselves into the LM. This activity usually took several 
tries to ingress the LM and was quite a fatiguing process. Jerry Goodman, an 
Apollo vehicle engineer who helped with the LM hatch design, identified that the 
problem occurred before the vehicle arrived on the Moon. Apparently the hatch 
design and pressurized suit design, although dependent and initially 
corroborated, later changed without being communicated to the other. The LM 
hatch size was decreased, but the suit got bigger and no one realized this until 
the crews tried ingressing the vehicle on the Moon. 
 
16. An airlock may make ingress/egress easier and will also be a good idea 
from a dust control standpoint. Designing an airlock to separate the vehicle 
hatch from the habitation area could decrease the risk of tracking lunar dust into 
the lunar module. 
 
17. Surface activities can begin once operationally feasible. Crews generally 
felt a little “wobbly” upon stepping on the moon, but this was attributed to 
adapting to the EVA suit CG and the partial gravity rather than neurovestibular 
dysfunction. This statement had been reported in the literature20 and needed to 
be explained to understand whether this would be a problem for lunar crews in 
the future. Coordination seemed to improve steadily during first couple of hours 
on the surface. The crews denied problems with spatial orientation on lunar 
landing. This was a concern operationally as experience with rotary wing pilots 
suggests spatial disorientation and conditions known as “brown out” have 
contributed to accidents. The commander and lunar module pilots reported 
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similar conditions during landing operations on several missions14 but denied the 
occurrence of spatial disorientation. 
 
18. There is no special training needed for 1/6g EVA’s other than a 
familiarization session. The astronauts stated the limited training they received 
using the Partial Gravity Simulator (POGO) and parabolic flight aircraft was 
sufficient for preparing them for lunar EVAs. Future lunar crews would do well to 
use this as lunar familiarization training but should not engage in elaborate partial 
gravity training devices or environments as the human body quickly adapts to the 
1/6 g environment of the moon. 
 
19. Limit navigation into craters to < 20-26° slope. Aside from the risk for 
injury on slopes greater than 20-26 °, the crews reported that they had to use a 
side-stepping approach to going up and down sloped terrain because of the 
limitations in suit mobility. This motion often placed the inertial mass of the suit 
and crewmember on one leg, which would tire after repetitive loading, either 
uphill or downhill. The slope of the terrain affected the ability to perform this 
motion and the crews estimated that 20-26° was the safe limit unassisted. 
 
20. Crews requested that an automatic position determination device be 
available to aid navigation on the lunar surface. All sorts of ambiguities exist 
on the Moon, e.g. slopes, terrains, sun shadows, and bland environments. With 
the undulating terrain, it was very easy to lose known points of reference and 
geographic orientation despite being well versed in the two-dimensional 
topography. One lunar crewmember admitted to spending twenty minutes trying 
to re-orientate during the surface traverse. A navigation system available on the 
suit HUD and/or rover would be very helpful and save time during surface 
operations. 
 
21. Ladder rung height and width on the LM were good but the glove did 
not allow adequate grip for safety. Crews were able to ascend and descend 
the LM ladder without difficulty and felt the rung height and width were easy to 
use. Their only concern was related to the inability to adequately grip the rung or 
side rails due to the limitations in the glove (see EVA suit section). Ladder height 
could be a concern if the glove issues are not addressed, especially if the 
crewmember is carrying equipment or an individual up the ladder. 
 
22. Ensure adequate water and food are available before and during lunar 
EVA. Lunar EVA ranged from 3.5 to 7.5 hours. Total in-suit time for surface 
operations averaged 10 hours. Bear in mind that the LM atmosphere was similar 
to the CM at 5.0 psia and 100% O2 therefore no EVA pre-breathe period was 
required. It is generally recommended that humans should drink 4-6 ounces of 
fluid for every 30 minutes of moderate exercise to maintain adequate hydration 
status21. The Apollo crews stated that they became thirsty and hungry during 
their LEVA and suggested making available adequate amounts of high-energy 
food and plain water. 
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23. Lunar EVA should be performed as one continuous event. The question 
was raised regarding LEVA and whether it should be broken down into two 
shorter duration events allowing the crew time to hydrate and replenish energy 
stores, etc. or as one continuous event. The astronauts’ inputs overwhelmingly 
supported the later choice as the suit and vehicle prep time for LEVA take up an 
unreasonable amount of crew time. 
 
24. Risk factors for injuries identified. The Apollo astronauts were queried 
about risky behaviors on the lunar surface or conditions that could predispose 
them to injuries. Overall, the crews felt the injury risk was low related to the 
partial gravity providing considerable time to react to a fall and the relatively short 
distance to fall considering their lunar weight was 1/6 their Earth weight. They 
were quick to mention that the videos of their falls on the Moon were misleading: 
it did not hurt to fall. However, the crews pointed out that their inertial mass did 
not change on the Moon. Given the EVA suit/PLSS (~194 lbs. on Earth) and 
crewmember mass and right set of circumstances listed below, sufficient energy 
could be applied to a joint or extremity to cause injury. 
 
a) Navigation into sloped terrain or craters > 20-26°. A fall on sloped 
terrain may be well tolerated unless the crew was moving or carrying 
an external load, such as equipment or rock samples. Although the 
exact angle of the slope was an estimate, the crews remarked that 
stable footing was limited and leg fatigue would become more 
pronounced in terrain steeper than approximately 26°. Lack of suit 
mobility, primarily at the hips, compounded getting in and out of steep 
terrain. Another concern was the lack of peripheral vision in the suit 
and the inability to see where an outstretched hand might land. Hand 
or wrist injuries were more of a concern for some of the crewmembers 
than lower extremity injuries. The ability to estimate crater dimensions 
was compromised as mentioned by one crewmember in the following 
statement: “Reflective light in the shadows isn’t as evident as on earth. 
Craters did appear steeper visually. We knew we had to go down into 
that crater, so it gave us concern.” 
 
b) Rover activities. The safety harness took roughly three minutes to 
fasten and some crews opted not to engage the buckle. The 
astronauts stated that the lunar module pilot in the right seat was at 
particular risk of falling out due to the undulating terrain and often 
being tilted downward and out the vehicle. 
 
c) Falling from a height. Falling from the rim of a steep crater was a 
concern in some instances. Ladder height on the LM was less that six 
feet, but it became a concern with the poor glove grip mechanics. 
Mention of the proposed LSAM ladder height ranging from 20-28 feet 
drew sighs and obvious concern for injury. 
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25. To ensure operational success and optimize performance of the crews, 
allow adequate time to practice mission activities in a variety of 
environments including analogs that allow preparation for off-nominal 
events. The Apollo astronauts used at least five different analog environments 
for training and testing equipment. The crewmembers stated that training in a 
lunar analog environment prepared them for actual lunar surface operations. 
They also indicated that this training gave them confidence under nominal 
circumstances that they would be well prepared for off-nominal events. 
 
26. Plan the operations on the surface so that you protect the crews from 
themselves. This recommendation relates to the earlier recommendation about 
protecting the crews from overwork and burnout. Adequate time is required for 
the lunar crews to have mental and physical rest during and between LEVA to 
prevent mistakes and reduce the risk of injury. 
 
27. With extended ops on the moon, establish all the experiments in the 
first week. Related to the previous recommendation, the Apollo crewmembers 
were sensitive to the fact that lunar surface operations are difficult and 
demanding work. Astronauts with longer surface-stay time would be more likely 
to make mistakes in procedures or handling equipment. Therefore, it would be 
good practice to deploy all the experiments and heavy load activity within the first 
week of a lunar stay to minimize error and injury risk. 
 
28. A robot should perform routine, systematic, repetitive, menial tasks 
(may help prevent repetitive use injuries). Physical tasks, such as surface 
drilling, moving equipment, and setting up experiments should be performed by 
automated systems to the extent possible to minimize repetitive use injuries and 
free up crewmember time on the surface. Examples of overuse injuries include 
medial or lateral epicondylitis in the elbow, DeQuervain’s tenosynovitis at the 
wrist, and shoulder rotator cuff injuries. These overuse injuries have been 
reported in astronaut training22. Other overuse injuries seen in microgravity EVA 
include fingertip and fingernail trauma.  Repetitive use also poses a risk of 
associated space suit wear and tear. 
 
29. The Rover should have the ability to recharge your suit. The crews felt 
they could have performed longer LEVA but were limited to the consumables in 
the suit. A remote recharge station in the field or placed on the rover could 
potentially extend surface activity duration or be used in the event of a suit 
incident, such as a leak. 
 
In-flight Illnesses 
 
30. Low back pain should be treated with aggressive pre-mission and in-
flight core strengthening program. Some crewmembers have complained of 
significant low back pain (LBP). Low back pain was noticed early on in space 
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flight by >70% of crewmembers. Symptoms are relieved by curving back into the 
fetal position. Aspirin and other analgesics provided little to no relief which has 
been a consistent finding throughout the space program23. Etiology is unclear but 
probably related to stretching of the fibers of the intervertebral disc’s annulus 
fibrosis. Interestingly, the crewmembers denied exacerbations of LBP on lunar 
surface or return to 1g. The astronauts suggested developing a preflight exercise 
protocol to strengthen abdominal muscles. This recommendation is consistent 
with musculoskeletal expert recommendation that abdominal or “core” 
strengthening pre- and in-flight helps improve lumbar spine strength and stability 
and may prevent or lessen in-flight low back pain24. 
 
31. Therapy to relieve muscle soreness, primarily in the forearms, must be 
available (improved glove design may assist this). All the lunar astronauts 
suffered from some degree of forearm soreness during their surface activities. 
This soreness was related to repetitive grasping-releasing against resistance in 
the pressurized glove. Although the soreness improved overnight, this could 
result in overuse injury if the crew was subjected to consecutive LEVA. Therapy, 
such as non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medication, heat packs, and massage 
were offered as solutions by the crewmembers. The overall solution in their mind 
however was improving the glove design and adding mechanical assist with 
repetitive grasping-releasing motions. 
 
32. Constipation: improve the waste management collection system. 
Constipation was related to diet (low residue), low fluid intake, and waste 
management problems. Individual crewmembers intentionally “constipated” 
themselves with Lomotil in order to reduce the frequency or prevent BM’s. One 
CMP went the entire 6-day mission without a BM. 
 
33. Screen for CAD prior to selection for lunar missions. The arrhythmia 
experienced during lunar EVA in one Apollo lunar crewmember was presumed to 
be related to hypokalemia (low serum potassium level) and dehydration on the 
lunar surface. This forced subsequent crews to take potassium supplements, 
which caused loose stools. This problem was compounded by a marginal waste 
management system. Underlying coronary artery disease (CAD) was the cause 
of arrhythmia in this crewmember found years later. Current CAD screening for 
ISS crewmembers is much more sensitive than the screening technology in the 
1960s and should detect this condition in astronauts. 
 
34. A physician crewmember would increase the comfort level among the 
crewmembers and can be cross-trained to do other activities. This was a 
consensus statement among the crewmembers regarding extended duration 
lunar operations. The Apollo crews had limited medical training and relied on 
input from the ground flight surgeon for medical issues (if they acknowledged that 
a medical issue occurred). A physician astronaut could be cross-trained to carry 
out mission related activities, as has been the experience during Skylab, STS, 
and NASA-Mir programs. One Apollo astronaut remarked, “Hell, if they can take 
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a naval aviator and train him to do geology [on the Moon] they sure as hell can 
train a doctor to do useful things.” 
 
35. Adequate preventive measures and treatment for diarrhea must be 
available. Another consensus statement by the crews was related to the bad 
experience using the Apollo waste management system. Unless this system is 
improved, loose or liquid stool contaminants in the cabin is very difficult to 
manage and clean.  Fecal-oral contamination and infection also becomes an 
issue. Therefore, medications and/or dietary measures must be available to 
prevent its occurrence. 
 
Medication/Medical Kits (Appendix D) 
 
36. A card in the med kit to inform the crew of the medication duration, 
indication, and interaction with other meds is needed. Confusion regarding 
use of medication, and more importantly, the duration of action occurred on 
several missions. This prevented crewmembers from using medications properly. 
One CDR remarked that he had forgotten how long Dexedrine lasted and 
suggested putting a card in the med kit to inform the crew of the medication 
duration, indication, and interaction with other meds. Crew felt they did not want 
to report any medication usage or other problems because of privacy concerns 
(private medical conference (PMC) was not available on the early Apollo 
missions). In addition to this recommendation, crew education by the flight 
surgeon was requested. It is important to note that current STS and ISS medical 
kits have this information readily available to the crews. 
 
37. Add non-sedating antihistamines for allergy symptoms due to lunar 
dust exposure. Symptoms related to lunar dust were described like allergies 
with runny nose, nasal congestion, and itchy, watery eyes. These symptoms 
gradually subsided with subsequent exposure during the short lunar stays. One 
Apollo astronaut recommended, “Adding a non-sedating antihistamine like 
Claritin® to the med kit might help.” One of the Apollo flight surgeons related a 
story of moderately severe upper respiratory symptoms due to lunar dust 
exposure when he unstowed the suits after landing. These symptoms worsened 
with each subsequent exposure. He noted moderate elevations the total WBC 
count, primarily the eosinophil levels that are commonly associated with allergic 
reactions. It is important to note that he did not have pre-exposure baseline WBC 
counts done to document if the elevation was in fact due to the lunar dust 
exposure. Lunar dust however is not an allergen but a toxic irritant, so it is 
unlikely that an anti-histamine would work to ameliorate the upper respiratory 
symptoms. This area is currently under investigation by the Lunar Airborne Dust 
Toxicity Analysis Group (LADTAG). 
 
38. Saline eye drops need to be available in large quantities (however an 
eyewash will be available as part of the environmental health kit). The lunar 
dust was ubiquitous in the vehicle cabin, and was very difficult to clear from the 
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hands. Cabin fiberglass was also a problem on some of the missions. In each 
case ocular irritation occurred that required copious saline irrigation to treat. The 
crews felt that plenty of saline eye drops should be available in the med kit for 
both ocular and nasal toilet. 
 
39. Provide items that are needed in daily life, e.g. nail clippers, lotions, 
Band-Aids, etc. (Individual hygiene kit will be available). During medical 
debriefs, several crewmembers noted frustration at not having items used during 
the course of normal daily hygiene available in the on-board kits. 
 
40. Sufficient analgesia to treat headaches. Headaches were frequently 
reported during the missions. Crews were concerned that they may be due to 
elevated cabin CO2 levels but the monitoring devices were unreliable. 
Headaches are one of the symptoms of Space Adaptation Syndrome (SAS)20 
and noted as one of the most frequently occurring symptom throughout the 
space program. Crews used acetaminophen or ibuprofen with improvement in 
symptoms. The recommendation was for a sufficient quantity to supply all 
astronauts for the duration of their mission. 
 
41. Sleep medication must promote restful sleep but not be too sedating. 
The sleep medication used during Apollo, Seconal, was a barbiturate. Side 
effects included excessive sedation and “hangover” effect, essentially drowsiness 
the day after a dose. Some lunar crews described sleep on the Moon as “two 
hours of nodding off” but were reluctant to take the sleep medication because of 
the sedation effect. The sleep medications, currently used by US astronauts on 
STS and ISS, are of a different drug class and generally much less sedating and 
promote restful sleep. 
 
42. An adequate delivery system for nasal decongestants must be available 
for the crewmembers. Nasal congestion was experienced by most 
crewmembers, and was attributed to the 100% O2 environment, dust, and viral 
exposures preflight. Actifed was used and provided moderate relief. 
Oxymetazoline (Afrin®), a topical decongestant, was unavailable for Apollo 7-13 
due to packaging problems. Lunar crews stated that symptoms resolved on lunar 
surface after initial exposure to dust only to return when reentering the CM as the 
particulates floated in the cabin. 
 
Environmental Impacts 
 
43. Consider adapting the Skylab waste management system into the new 
vehicles. In general, the Apollo waste management system worked satisfactorily 
from an engineering standpoint. However, throughout the medical debriefs the 
crews reported that the system required ~45 minutes from start to end for 
defecation. Crew had to strip off underwear requiring BIOMED sensors be 
removed which was a time consuming process. Application of the Apollo bag was 
often difficult. One Apollo astronaut described the process as “a complete mess” 
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and “the only part of the whole mission that made me feel uncivilized.” Crews 
highly recommended creating a device that would allow them to assume a 
squatting position to have a BM. The Skylab charcoal system was good for waste 
management as it provided both the ability for the crew to strap down to the toilet 
assuming the squatting position and a ventilation system that controlled odor. 
However, off-nominal “output” such as loose stool or diarrhea is an issue not 
adequately addressed by either Apollo or Skylab systems. The urine collection 
system was “lousy” as the UCD frequently leaked. The crew was very concerned 
about voiding difficulties during critical operations. The urine bag, if used, created 
backpressure in the system, which contributed to one occurrence of in-flight 
urinary tract infection. 
 
44. The sleep restraint system on the Apollo CM worked well and should be 
incorporated into the new vehicle design. The straps used on the couches 
allowed the crewmembers to fasten securely within the sleeping bag. Some 
crewmembers found wedging themselves under the couches comfortable. The 
sleep system used in the LM was adequate, with a few members commenting 
that the hammock was very comfortable in 1/6 G, but other factors impaired 
restful sleep. One crewmember chose to sleep on the LM floor but found it very 
cold and dirty with lunar dust. 
 
45. Sleeping bag needs to be large enough for crewmembers to get both 
knees to their chest. The crewmembers often assumed this “fetal position” to 
treat low back pain and found it difficult, if not impossible, to bring both knees to 
their chest during sleep. 
 
46. Thermal protective clothing or equipment should be available on board. 
The Apollo 13 crews suffered hypothermia in the 39°F LM they used as a 
“lifeboat” during the contingency return. The EVA suits were available but they 
chose not wear them because of the difficulty stowing and unstowing items from 
storage compartments. The A13 CDR and LMP offered the recommendation that 
a simple, light, and effective thermal blanket should be available in contingency 
situations. 
 
47. Drinking water should be available during sleep periods. The CM and LM 
cabin was very dry prompting a frequent need to drink water, interrupting sleep. 
The astronauts suggested having a water bottle available next to the couch or in 
the sleeping bag. 
 
48. Hot water capability for hygiene, beverage, and food preparation is 
essential. The astronauts felt very strongly that having the capability to heat 
water for routine daily dietary and hygiene use was a necessity. Cold water 
would be nice to have, but hot water required, a position they felt was not 
negotiable. 
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49. Apollo bag aperture and capacity needs to be larger and easier to apply 
in microgravity. The Apollo bag was a bag that crew members passed stool 
into.  Crews unanimously stated that the Apollo bag aperture was too small and 
the application was very difficult in microgravity. A better system has to be 
developed for future crews. 
 
50. Create a device that would allow crewmembers to assume a squatting 
position in microgravity. The crews summed it up well with this statement: “Try 
pooping standing up with a bag stuck to your butt and see how you like it.” 
Engineers will have to do a better job in the waste management design on future 
vehicles. 
 
51. Do not design the galley and waste management areas together. The 
reason for this recommendation should be obvious but the Apollo galley and 
waste management area were designed within a foot of each other. The crews 
frequently had diminished appetites for other reasons and did not need the 
added effect of odor and mess to further compromise their nutritional intake. 
 
52. Minimize noise but do not eliminate it (earplugs are an adequate 
countermeasure for noise). Noise was an issue for sleep, especially on the LM, 
but was comforting to the crew. Non-essential communications from MCC were 
annoying and need to be eliminated during the sleep period. Simple ear plugs 
work well and more elaborate systems are not necessary.  As an aside, in the LM 
sunlight was blocked with shades to aid in restful sleep. 
 
53. Carbon dioxide (CO2) monitoring device needs to be robust and reliable. 
The CO2 monitor was frequently malfunctioning with resultant unreliable sensor 
readings. Crews often remarked they had headaches during the missions, one of 
the initial symptoms associated with elevated CO2 levels. The faulty sensor 
system made it difficult to attribute the crew’s symptoms to elevated CO2 levels in 
the cabin. This problem persists today on the STS and ISS with crews frequently 
reporting headaches. 
 
54. A food warmer is desirable. 
 
55. Astronaut participation in the design and development phases of the 
new vehicles is essential. The Apollo astronauts were intimately involved with 
the requirement development phase through vehicle assembly. Many attributed 
their mission success to this knowledge of the vehicle systems and hardware. 
Astronauts associated with the new vehicles should be involved with all phases 
of its development. 
 
56. RFID tags should be considered for stowage items. Radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) systems are well established in organizing stowage and 
retrieval of equipment and other mission gear. This system would provide a 
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reliable tool to locate items within the stowage compartments of the new vehicles 
and track consumables usage. 
 
57. LSAM windows should be designed to see only what is necessary for 
landing and/or rendezvous with IR protection. Windows are heavy 
components of the vehicle and should be designed with these requirements to 
minimize their mass. Crews will require adequate protection from IR radiation 
exposure. 
 
58. Design an efficient method for clearing the lunar dust from the vehicle 
cabin. Lunar dust particles floated everywhere in the LM upon return to 
microgravity. Dust particles got into crewmembers eyes, nose, and chest, which 
prompted the Apollo 12 crew to keep their helmets on prior to docking with CSM. 
The dust did not appear to be filtered from the environment through 
ventilation/LiOH system although the vacuum cleaner that was used beginning 
with Apollo 14 seemed to help clear the larger particles. 
 
Radiation 
 
59. The lunar excursion vehicle should have an active radiation detector 
with an automated audible alarm that sounds when the dose rate exceeds a 
predetermined level. The Apollo mission plan for a radiation event on the lunar 
surface was based on incorrect assumptions. The assumption was that after 
Earth-orbiting satellites detected the initial x-rays, the crews had between 15-20 
hours before the solar protons arrived at the Moon25. During this time the crews 
would be directed to make the traverse back across the lunar terrain from the 
worksite to the LM, prepare the vehicle and launch off the surface, successfully 
rendezvous with the CM, dock and secure the hatch, transfer to the CM, and 
rotate the vehicle so that the thicker side of the vehicle faced the sun thereby 
absorbing the radiation. Apollo crews did not have an active radiation detection 
and alarm system with them on the lunar surface. Recently, a solar event 
occurred where energetic protons arrived at Earth within 5-20 minutes of the 
original x-ray detection. (Note: We also have more information about the 
directionality of solar protons and this suggests crews should not launch from the 
lunar surface during a solar particle event.) Obviously, the Apollo response 
requires reconsideration. The crews were adamant that the lunar return crews 
have the capability to detect hazardous radiation levels. The EVA suit, rover, and 
habitat should have the capability to provide autonomous detection and 
immediate response countermeasures should be embedded in these systems. 
 
60. A personal radiation dosimeter (PRD) is a requirement for all 
crewmembers. Although this was a requirement for all crewmembers, some of 
the Apollo crewmembers neglected to wear the device in the suit during lunar 
surface operations. They recommended designing it into the suit garments 
thereby eliminating the possibility that it would be left behind. 
 
 21 of 63 
DRAFT 
 
61. The rover should be equipped with a radiation shield. A durable and 
effective shield for solar protons should be available for crews on the lunar 
vehicle for a solar particle event. 
 
62. Radiation protectants should be made available to the crewmembers. 
Recent developments in radioprotectants suggest that they may be useful to 
mitigate the risk of developing radiation sickness in crews exposed to solar 
radiation. The Apollo astronauts stated that they would consider using such 
compounds if exposed to radiation while on the lunar surface. 
 
63. Create a trench with shovels or explosives to protect the crew short 
term in the event of a solar particle event (SPE). For radiation protection on 
the surface, creating a trench with shovels or explosives would be adequate to 
protect the crew short term. It is important to cover the trench quickly with 
regolith. A real-time active PRD in the suit will let you know how well you have 
done with regards to exposure and when it would be safe to leave the site. In-suit 
consumable recharge capability would have to be available. 
 
Performance/Human Factors 
 
64. Recreational activities need to be made available for crews during trans 
lunar coast (TLC) and trans Earth coast (TEC). Trans-lunar and Trans-Earth 
coast were relatively “boring,” however, this was an individual experience. Crew 
wish they had brought recreation materials. Apollo Command Module Pilots 
(CMP) remarked that the CDR/LMP could relax but he was always on task during 
this [TLC/TEC] mission phase. Crewmembers reported that they liked having the 
non-work related time during TLC and TEC, but wanted recreational activities 
available during this time. Exercise was one of the most desirable activities 
during this mission phase. This was also important for the CMP during lunar 
surface operations. Apollo crews recommended for long-duration missions “make 
the space vehicle environment as normal as it is down on Earth.” The CEV 
should be as autonomous as possible. Several of the CMP’s stated that it was 
difficult at times to stay focused during lunar surface operations. Air-to-ground 
communications helped tremendously. MSFN relay was the best thing CMP had 
during this time. Other activities included watching the local news to make the 
day more similar to Earth. Delegation of routine operational “chores” and flight 
plan maintenance to the MCC would free the CMP to do non-work related 
activities, such as lunar or deep space photography. The A15 CMP stated he 
used this time to explore deep space while on the far side of the moon (shielded 
from the sun). He later claimed to have discovered black holes as a result of his 
uninterrupted time in the CM. 
 
65. Mental and physical rest plans should be introduced into extended 
moon stays to allow adequate rest between lunar EVA. “Consider mental and 
physical fatigue here separately. Although there was not a lot of physical fatigue 
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[during the lunar activity], the mind was being used quite a bit. You can 
sometimes wear your brain out before your body is fatigued.” 
 
66. Mission focus should be project-oriented and not timelined. The Apollo 
lunar surface crews lamented that the timeline on the Moon was very ambitious 
leaving little room for completing tasks in the event things did not go as planned. 
Future timelines should not be rushed and should allow crews to complete 
projects thereby minimizing error and potential injuries. A non-EVA suit related 
injury did occur during one mission that was a result of the astronaut trying to 
complete a timelined activity with a malfunctioning piece of equipment. The injury 
required the crewmember to use a rather excessive amount of analgesics for 
pain. 
 
67. Use of sleeping medication should be encouraged where appropriate. 
The crews were generally reluctant to use sleep medication because of the side 
effects previously described. “There was always the fear of not being alert if an 
emergency came up-this can’t work for long duration stays.” A number of 
astronauts also felt that use of sleep medication would be perceived among their 
peers and ground controllers as a sign of weakness. 
 
68. Countermeasures to combat mental fatigue are necessary throughout 
the mission. Mental fatigue pre-launch was due to the amount of non-essential 
training [that was not operationally oriented]. There was too much “just-in-time” 
before launch emergency procedure training. They suggested more “normal 
procedure” training and less emergency procedures training. Additionally, they 
suggested slowing the pace of training within 1-2 weeks prior to launch. They all 
launched fatigued. Preflight quarantine is very valuable as it allows time for 
simulation training, exercise, and rest. The crew schedule should have “slack 
early in the mission to allow time for learning/training.”  
 
69. Education and psychological services should be available to the 
crewmembers’ families. NASA should be more sensitive to the families needs 
than they were during Apollo. Family counseling was rejected by NASA when the 
crewmembers requested it. 
 
70. Allow adequate time in the schedule for all activities. In designing future 
mission scenarios, the following are recommendations for optimizing operational 
success and crew health: allow adequate time to practice mission activities in a 
variety of environments where tasks are defined and duplicated just like on the 
moon; allow time for all activities such as eating, resting, exercise, experiments, 
etc. This will take coordination with the mission planners, and is especially 
important to allow enough time for meals. However, the astronauts were quick to 
point out that during certain mission phases, such as rendezvous and docking, 
adequate time may not be available for these activities. 
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71. Provide adequate capabilities for sleeping on the lunar surface. Refer to 
the environmental section. The lunar crewmembers cited three environmental 
factors that impaired their ability to get restful sleep: light penetration into the 
vehicle, loud ambient noise level, and cool cabin temperature (particularly near 
the floor of the LM). Planners for the LSAM and future lunar habitat will have to 
correct these factors in addition to the aforementioned requirement for short-
acting, well-tolerated sleep medication that does not cause excessive sedation or 
hangover effect. In addition, the sleep facilities will have to take into account the 
factors mentioned in the environmental section. In addition, the EVA suit did not 
provide comfortable sleep on the lunar surface. The inability to get restful sleep 
on the moon [because of the suit] “could have jeopardized the mission.” 
 
72. If a crewmember dies during the mission “cut him loose.” Death of a 
crewmember during a mission is straightforward: “If a crewmember dies, you cut 
him loose. You can depressurize the hatch and dump him.” “Yes, if it happens, it 
happens…No psycho babble here.” The crews emphasized that trying to retain 
or recover a deceased astronaut could put the other crewmembers at risk. This 
plan would require working out the details far in advance of the mission so that all 
individuals involved, including the astronaut family members, would be prepared 
in the event this happened during a mission. 
 
73. In planning crew size/makeup, the authority structure is much more 
significant than crew size. This recommendation arose out of questions 
pertaining to the makeup of future exploration crews with regard to number of 
crewmembers, male/female ratios, etc. The Apollo astronauts were unified in 
their recommendation to emphasize that crew make-up requirements are 
secondary to the crew authority structure, i.e. the commander is in charge under 
all circumstances. The Apollo astronauts were military trained and understood 
authority structure, and this was never more evident than during Apollo 13. The 
crew supported their commander and insured that he was given whatever was 
necessary to make the correct decisions during the mission rather than trying to 
usurp his authority over concerns he might be succumbing to fatigue or stress. 
Bottom line with crew size/makeup is to make sure they understand who is in 
charge. The other issues are of less importance. 
 
74. Consider the impact on the mission control flight teams and take 
actions to ensure that they are rested and provided for during the lunar 
missions. The crewmembers were sensitive to the demands made on the flight 
control teams and their families that resulted from planning and carrying out a 
lunar mission. They urge that NASA take necessary steps to support these 
individuals and their families during all phases of the mission. This included 
allowing enough time for sleep, family time, and training prior to and during the 
mission. The impact of the workload of mission control support personnel is a 
factor. In addition, they need defined sleep periods and time off to keep the 
mission functioning. 
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Crew Schedule 
 
75. Preflight quarantine is very valuable for providing time for mission 
simulation, exercise, and rest. From an operational point of view, it removed a 
large number of distractions from the last three weeks of preparations and the 
crews were much more rested for launch. 
 
76. The preflight training schedule should allow crews to concentrate on 
issues that will be used for the nominal mission. The crews wanted only 
mission related activities, such as simulator training and safety briefings, to 
occupy their time during the month prior to launch. Activities outside of training, 
such as exercise and rest, were often compromised during this time and should 
be as high a priority as any other training issue. 
 
77. Lunar crews should have one day/week for “rest” (freedom to select 
their activity). During the lunar surface stay, crews should have a scheduled day 
of rest during each seven-day period. This day would not have timelined activities 
but could be used at the crew’s discretion. The Apollo astronauts emphasized 
that for extended duration operations, the crew will burn out if they do not have 
protected rest time during the week. 
 
78. An eight hour per day sleep period must be protected in the daily 
schedule and must not be compromised. Crew rest time was often the subject 
of compromise in the daily timeline, as it is today. However, the crew strongly 
encouraged the flight surgeons to protect the sleep period regardless of whether 
the crew actually slept. Circadian rhythm was considered not to have been an 
issue on lunar expeditions. Regarding sleep shifting, it was not optimum to have 
large shifts in short periods of time. Also, the Schumann Resonance Frequency 
(SRF) must be considered. Crews suggested discussions with experts to 
evaluate the risk factor influencing sleep cycles once the crew is out of the 
Earth’s geomagnetosphere. 
 
79. Crews should be scheduled for simultaneous sleep periods. The initial 
Apollo missions had staggered crew sleep periods but were later changed to 
accommodate all crewmembers. This practice should be continued with the lunar 
return missions. 
 
Exercise 
 
80. Loosen the pre-mission timeline to allow adequate time for preflight 
conditioning program. 
 
81. A more robust (and lightweight) piece of in-flight exercise equipment is 
needed than the Apollo Exer-Genie. This device was the only exercise 
equipment available during the Apollo missions and was used by all 
crewmembers with varying amounts and intensities. A major limitation in the 
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Exer-Genie use was the friability of the ropes that connected to the cylinder that 
provided resistance and the heat that was generated with its use. The Apollo CM 
atmosphere was 100% O2 and there was a real concern that the heat generated 
represented a fire hazard. The crews used the device at sub-maximal levels to 
reduce heat generation. One crewmember stated that the rope and material 
“frays and kinda smells” after prolonged use. 
 
82. The flight surgeon/mission planners should not plan specific exercise 
prescriptions for short duration (< 14 days) mission. The crews performed 
exercise for rest and relaxation purposes as much as for the physical benefit. 
They cautioned the flight surgeons against trying to timeline specific exercises. 
They felt the crews should be instructed on what exercise would be beneficial 
and applicable for the device available, choosing what they wanted to do during 
short duration missions. 
 
83. Exercise is not necessary on short trips (14 days or less) [from a fitness 
standpoint], however crews demanded that the capability be available and 
varied as much as possible for crew “rest and relaxation” in all phases of 
the mission. The crews did not feel that they suffered noticeable deconditioning 
during their relatively short missions. They do not dispute the science that shows 
muscle and bone strength decrements with longer microgravity exposures, 
however. In the context of their short missions and lunar EVAs, they were able to 
perform all mission related activities without concern from loss of strength or 
stamina. However, the astronauts demanded exercise capability for the CM for 
rest and relaxation purposes. A couple of crewmembers also experienced minor 
Achilles tendonitis after return to Earth and suggested that a more aggressive 
lower extremity stretching program enroute to home may have prevented this 
occurrence. The lunar surface crews felt that their activities on the Moon 
provided enough exercise for a short duration mission but would have welcomed 
a simple, robust device for stretching and forearm strengthening exercise. 
 
84. Develop a better preflight and in-flight forearm muscle-conditioning 
program for lunar crewmembers. In addition to the core stabilization program 
as described earlier in the illness/injury section, a strengthening program for the 
forearm muscles before and during the mission is necessary. Upper extremity 
exercises, specifically to strengthen and maintain shoulder strength and stamina, 
will be necessary in the preflight period and during the mission. Operating the 
surface tools in partial gravity, particularly the drill, requires more force generated 
from the shoulders than needed in 1 g. 
 
85. New vehicle design should allow a variety of different exercise 
capabilities (hardware vs. cabin structure). Recommended examining the new 
spacecraft design to determine surfaces or structures within the vehicle to 
exercise various muscle groups. A more robust (and lightweight) piece of 
equipment is needed. The Crews performed isotonic exercises against the struts 
of the LM on the surface before EVA’s. Another example of using the vehicle in 
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novel ways to perform exercise included “running in place holding onto the 
couch,” isometrics performed against cabin structures, etc. 
 
86. Put as many [exercise] capabilities in the vehicle as possible, because 
it will get used. Many crewmembers felt exercise capability throughout flight will 
be critical. A variety of exercises must be provided. 
 
87. New exercise devices should be reliable, simple, and not develop 
excessive heat in use. The crew was concerned towards the end of the mission 
that they were going to “break the machine” and began tapering down the 
exercise duration and intensity to protect the equipment so that it would be 
available for reconditioning prior to re-entry. 
 
Food/ Nutrition 
 
88. Mission activity (e.g. coast, rendezvous, lunar orbit, lunar OPS, etc.) will 
dictate what type and how much food will be consumed. Apollo diets offered 
2100-2660 kcal/day, but the crews seldom obtained these required energy 
intakes. During busy mission phases, the crews often went without eating or 
drinking because of issues with preparing food or problems associated with the 
water system. They recommended that meal planners work with mission 
planners to coordinate easily accessible food that could be prepared quickly to 
ensure that crew energy needs are met throughout all mission phases. Specific 
examples of mission activity and appropriate food types include: 
• High activity – wet packages, bite-sized snacks, canned foods 
• Low activity – spoon-bowls, dry juice or meals (rehydratable) requiring 
mixing etc. 
 
89. Plain water in large quantities needs to be available for lunar EVA. The 
crewmembers stated that they needed more plain water available for LEVA. As 
was mentioned in the EVA suit and Lunar Surface Operations section, the lunar 
crews often went 10 hours without a break after suiting up. 
 
90. Optimize diet and food intake for overall performance during long 
duration missions. 
 
91. An in-suit non-caffeinated solid or liquid carbohydrate food source for 
lunar EVA would be helpful. 
 
92. Design adequate space and useful area in the new vehicles to store 
food packs during meals. Lack of available space and useful area to store food 
packs during meals made eating difficult. Food preparers need to be mindful of 
the difficulties associated with performing tasks in microgravity. 
 
93. Spicy and salty foods are preferred items in the menu. Overall, the food 
lacked flavor or spice. Crews preferred the salty bite-sized snacks or other 
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flavorful items as their taste perception changed in space compared to the 
preflight food testing. 
 
94. Allow adequate time in the daily schedule for meals. Refer to comments 
in recommendation # 88. 
 
95. Determine how different environmental factors (e.g. O2 concentration, 
cabin pressure) effect food flavor. Foods tested preflight tasted fine but were 
“absolutely unattractive in-flight.” One crewmember who had flown both an Apollo 
and STS mission stated he had a poor experience with food during Apollo but the 
same food flown on Shuttle was palatable and tasty. His experience raised the 
question of the effect of the 5.0 psia and 100% O2 atmosphere of Apollo on food 
integrity or taste perception compared to the 14.7 psia and 21% O2 of the Space 
Shuttle. The future vehicles have a proposed cabin atmosphere of 7.6-8.0 psia at 
30-32% O2. 
 
Launch, Landing and Recovery Ops 
 
96. Provide adequate cooling capabilities for the crew on landing to 
mitigate the hot cabin contribution to crewmember seasickness. 
Considerable weight loss was attributed to sweating and dehydration that 
occurred on landing secondary to seasickness. Inadequate cabin/suit cooling 
after landing was cited as the primary contributor to both conditions. The future 
landing vehicle must have adequate cooling capabilities for the crews. The onset 
and severity of seasickness will be determined by the crew’s ability to stay cool 
more than anything else. 
 
97. Ground landings are discouraged. This was not a consensus statement 
among the crewmembers. A number of the Apollo astronauts were adamant that 
a ground landing would likely kill the crewmembers. NASA has considerable 
experience with water landing, have never lost a crew by landing in the sea, and 
have a much larger margin of error for re-entry. Ground landings do not afford 
much error and may pose a threat to humans in populated areas with an off-
trajectory re-entry profile. The dissenting Apollo astronauts, however, mentioned 
that we now have extensive experience via the shuttle with ground landings, and 
that perhaps water landings could be used to build confidence before moving 
forward with ground landings. 
 
98. Apollo seat configuration for water landings was adequate. The seats 
were adequate for re-entry despite force distributed throughout body. Impact was 
well distributed across the back. Couches and restraints were adequate for 
landing and launching from the Earth and Moon in terms of side and head 
protection. All loose items need to be restrained; one crewmember sustained a 
scalp laceration after being struck in the head by an object that came loose when 
the capsule impacted the water. 
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99. Medication for motion sickness and fatigue will be available prior to re-
entry. Scopolamine 0.3mg/Dexedrine 5mg were taken by several crewmembers 
prior to re-entry and again at splashdown to prevent motion sickness (MS) and to 
combat fatigue. 
 
100. Sea state should be limited to < 6-8 foot swells if recovery is to be 
delayed. Most of the Apollo astronauts were naval aviators or experienced pilots 
with one exception. Nearly all the astronauts experienced seasickness, some 
reporting the onset of symptoms within 30-60 seconds of the water landing. The 
crews strongly recommended that the recovery sea state be limited to less than 
6-8 foot seas. 
 
101. Have food and plain water within reach of buckled crewmembers for 
delayed recovery. Dehydration was a significant concern due to lack of suit or 
cabin cooling. Food and plain water will need to be readily available for the crews 
in sufficient amounts to sustain the crew until recovery teams can remove crew 
from the landing capsule. 
 
102. Apollo CM hatch location and size was adequate for egress. Hatch 
location for landing egress was ok. Apollo crewmembers denied having any 
trouble emerging from the capsule after landing. The crews offered a mixed 
response as to whether they would have been able to assist an injured 
crewmember in an emergency scenario. Crewmembers also recommended that 
the hatch on the re-entry vehicle open outward. A hatch design that opens 
outward but does not seal with pressure is very dangerous. 
 
103. All control panels and switches should be within reach of 
crewmembers during launch and landing. Regarding the control panels and 
switches, all required functions were within reach during high g and zero g in the 
Apollo CM. This was tested in centrifuge runs in the design and development 
phase. The same approach should be taken for the new launch and return 
vehicle. 
 
104. Training for pad abort was adequate and should be continued. The 
slide wire abort works. One crewmember felt the egress route under the pad 
room in Apollo provided a faster and safer escape route than the slide wire. 
 
105. Crew surgeon should be on the recovery vessel and not the helicopter. 
The rescue crew provides all the necessary skills for safely transferring the crew 
from the vehicle to the helicopter. The crew flight surgeon serves his/her purpose 
best on the recovery ship and should not be put at risk in the recovery aircraft. 
 
 
 
Flight Surgeon-Crew Interaction 
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106. Crews encouraged the Flight Surgeon to “act as more of an advocate 
of the crew” than treat them as an experiment. Crews often felt the flight 
surgeon treated them as “an experiment” considering the demands the flight plan 
placed on them. Lack of PMC with flight surgeon limited the crew input regarding 
physiological functions and medication usage during flight. After one CMP was 
left hanging regarding his flight status due to an abnormal lab value 3 weeks prior 
to launch, the CDR and CMP both felt the flight surgeon was not looking out for 
the crew’s “mental well being.” The CDR emphasized that “emotional stress is 
one of the main issues [that surgeon] needs to help minimize both preflight and 
in-flight for his/her crew.” 
 
107. The collaboration established between the current flight surgeons and 
Apollo crewmembers should continue and be an example to future 
generations. 
 
Discussion 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify Apollo operational issues that impacted 
crew health and performance.  The specific goals of this project were to develop 
or modify medical requirements for new vehicles and habitats, to create a 
centralized database for future access, and to share relevant Apollo information 
with the multitude of entities at NASA and abroad participating in the exploration 
effort. Secondary objectives included using this information to validate current 
requirements and refresh knowledge regarding lunar operations.  The database 
has been created to complete this study, and the information gleaned is currently 
being shared among NASA entities. What remains is to discuss the modification 
of exploration medical requirements based on the experiences of the Apollo 
astronauts. 
 
The only sentient experience that the human race has with manned lunar 
exploration is through the perceptions and memories of the 22 surviving Apollo 
astronauts. As such, their experience and knowledge is a vast resource that has 
been surprisingly untapped in the ways in which this paper has attempted to 
extract. One of the reasons for this is the “cradle-to-grave” operational focus of 
the study. Underlying everything from the abstract to the conclusion was the 
ethos of “operationally driven outcomes”. In other words, the focus was to 
determine how the positive and negative experiences of the Apollo astronauts 
can improve the mission operations of the Constellation crews. The authors 
diligently focused on extracting that which had potential operational relevance, so 
that the varied audience could come away from the paper with something 
tangible to incorporate into their exploration work. Also, as discussed in the 
Methods section, previous published data was exhaustively researched to pre-
empt duplication of results and conclusions. Further, data contained within this 
paper has been reviewed for accuracy by the Apollo astronauts. Hence, the 
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results are an attempt at achieving untainted representations of the thoughts and 
recommendations of the Apollo astronauts themselves. Up to this point the 
authors of the paper have just been the “middle-men”.     
 
Therein lays both the strength and limitation of the ability of the Results to 
“develop or modify medical requirements for new vehicles and habitats”. Are 
these events and challenges that occurred over 35 years ago applicable today? 
On Apollo missions, the astronauts were allowed to bring one cassette tape into 
space for morale purposes. Today astronauts can carry an Ipod® with 80 
Gigabytes and 20,000 songs. True, there are now new paradigms and new 
technologies, however, the authors feel that those who don’t learn from history 
are bound to repeat it. Just as Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” is as true and applicable 
today as it was in the 6th century B.C., the lessons of the Apollo astronauts can 
find significance and relevance with future exploration missions. Limitations 
inherent in this study do, however, include non-response bias and the volunteer 
effect, procedure bias, and recall bias. Also, although there are limitations to the 
applicability of the 107 recommendations, some recommendations are “more 
relevant” than others. For example, there were many recommendations 
regarding the waste management system. Many of these issues have been 
vastly improved through years of shuttle and space station experience. These 
recommendations are somewhat “less relevant”. However, in general, the 
recommendations in the categories of EMU/EVA Suit Operations, Lunar Surface 
Operations, and Lunar Radiation are “more relevant” due to the fact that they are 
related more closely to Lunar exploration and have not yet been duplicated or 
improved upon. In the end, the relevance of each recommendation must be 
considered carefully and individually. 
 
The principle findings of this study can be broken down into broad pervasive 
themes and themes relevant to each of the 11 recommendation categories. 
Three themes were ubiquitous throughout the study. The first two, safety and 
mission accomplishment, were explicit and self-evident. These two ideas are 
intertwined, virtually impossible to separate, and at the core of every 
recommendation that was put forth. The third ever-present, but almost 
“unconscious” theme was one of human factors, and in particular, the idea that 
“the astronauts are only human”. When analyzing the raw data and results one 
gets the idea that the astronauts are imploring the establishment to acknowledge 
that they are humans, not robots, test subjects, or infallible beings. This was 
evident with multiple recommendations spanning the 11 categories. For example, 
scheduling-related recommendations were made in 4 of the categories for a total 
of 23 recommendations. Likewise, sleep-related recommendations were made in 
3 categories with 10 recommendations, and more generally, allocations for “rest 
and relaxation” were mentioned in 6 categories with ~26 recommendations. 
Further evidence of the astronauts’ recognition of their limitations includes 
multiple recommendations for ensuring adequate “self-maintenance” via 
exercise, nutrition and fluid intake, and a higher level of waste and personal 
hygiene. Finally, the astronauts made multiple recommendations (7 in 6 
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categories) and requests regarding Flight Surgeon/Physician advocacy and 
intervention. Military pilots traditionally have had an apprehensive relationship 
with Flight Surgeons; hence the astronauts’ appeal to seek assistance from 
someone who could potentially ground them should carry some weight. They 
even went so far as to unanimously recommend the addition of a physician-
astronaut as a crewmember, with the thought being that a physician-astronaut 
would increase the comfort level among the crew, and could serve as a strong 
advocate for astronaut needs while in space. A final observation worth 
mentioning is that the astronauts’ recommendations were very difficult to 
categorize. That is, a single recommendation such as “Improve glove flexibility, 
dexterity, fit”, simultaneously involves operations, engineering, human factors, 
safety, and mission accomplishment. This brought to the forefront the uniquely 
interdisciplinary nature of manned space exploration and the broad appeal of this 
paper. 
 
The tables following each category show the 107 recommendations followed by 
the current status and disposition of that recommendation.  The status definitions 
are as follows: 
 
In Practice  the recommendation is operational in current shuttle 
and ISS missions 
New Requirement   the listed requirement was created as a direct result of 
the Apollo recommendations 
Requirement Modified   the listed requirement was revised as a result of the 
Apollo recommendations 
Requirement Validated   the listed requirement was validated by the Apollo 
recommendations 
Being Evaluated   the recommendation is actively being analyzed for 
future requirements 
Consider   the recommendation is known by involved parties, but 
there is no formal review for acceptance or rejection 
Rejected   the recommendation has been evaluated and 
subsequently rejected as a requirement 
 
 
 
The emphasis of the recommendations varied through each of the 11 categories: 
EMU/EVA ISSUES 
 
Recommendations centered first and foremost on improving the functionality of 
the suit then improving both the human factors integration as well as specific 
safety features. The most adamant of the suit recommendations and a 
consensus statement was to improve the dexterity of the glove. This 
recommendation had mission accomplishment and safety as the driving 
concerns. Similarly, the astronauts recommended increasing ambulatory and 
functional capability through increased suit flexibility and decreased mass and 
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internal pressure. This would have the added benefit of decreasing fatigue as 
well. The astronauts’ human factors recommendations revolved around 
consumables and excretion. They recommended in-suit access to large amounts 
of high energy liquids and plain water, a Heads-up Display with consumable, 
biomedical, and navigation information on demand, and an improved urinary 
collection system. Safety concerns revolved around redundancy being built into 
the suit. In particular, they suggested a system to prevent helmet fogging under 
all circumstances, a self-sealing pressure garment in case of puncture, and a 
system to protect the zipper from abrasive lunar dust.   
 
Spacesuit technology has improved over the years through shuttle and ISS 
experience, however, only the Apollo astronauts have the experience of 
operating under 1/6 G in the lunar environment. As such, their insight is very 
relevant to exploration requirements.   
 
As can be seen in the table below, the EVA Systems Project (ESP) and the  
Human Research Program (HRP) via the EVA Physiology Systems and 
Performance (EPSP) element is quite active with this set of Apollo 
recommendations. The EPSP and ESP is aggressively evaluating multiple 
recommendations and considering several others. EPSP has a systematic test 
plan that will address all of the suit related issues and result in specific data 
backed recommendations for the optimal suit weight, mass, pressure, center of 
gravity, and kinematics (mobility) for lunar operations. Additionally, the EPSP and 
Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) team have addressed the UCD issues 
and have developed improvements to the Maximum Absorbant Garment (MAG).  
 
 
 
Table 3: EMU/EVA ISSUES Recommendation Implementation 
EMU/EVA ISSUES 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
1  Improve glove flexibility, dexterity, fit    
Being 
Evaluated 
Being Evaluated for Cx CP, suit 
D&C document (level 3)  Eval 
per ESP/EPSP   
 a) 
Gloves should be custom designed for 
each crewmember that incorporate 
mechanical closure for gripping In Practice 
Already in practice for flight 
gloves  
 b) 
Look into a wrist seal and 
depressurized glove Consider 
Will consider with counter 
pressure suit concept  
 c) 
Robotic power-assisted glove for 
repetitive tasks Consider 
Will consider in design for 
planetary suit configuration  
 d) Glove liners should be worn 
Requirement 
Validated 
Already in practice, to be 
continued in Cx D&C  
2  
Reduce the mass of the suit by a factor 
of two 
Being 
Evaluated 
Suit mass trades being 
evaluated by ESP/EPSP and suit 
engineers  
Fu
nc
tio
na
lit
y 
3  
Increase general mobility by a factor of 
four, primarily at the knee joint Consider 
Suit mobility requirements being 
defined by ESP/EPSP  
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4  Lower suit Center of Gravity 
Being 
Evaluated 
C.G. trades being evaluated by 
ESP/EPSP  
6  
Improve peripheral vision by adding 
neck ring (movable joint) 
Being 
Evaluated 
Trade between mobility vs. 
potential for landing injury due to 
a hard ring, evaluation by 
ESP/EPSP; requirement TBD in 
D&C document  
8  
The lunar boot functioned well and does 
not need to be improved. 
Requirement 
Validated 
Boot requirements in D&C 
Suit trauma eval per EPSP  
 
12  
The suit should be a low pressure (3.50 
psia), single gas system 
New 
Requirement 
Requirement in HSIR- variable 
pressure suit 3.5-8.0 psi; 100% 
O2; Suit pressure trades being 
evaluated by EPSP 3.5.5.2.2 
7  
Develop a reliable Heads Up Display 
that shows consumables information, 
limited biomedical data, and navigation 
on demand 
New 
Requirement 
Display requirement in HSIR for 
planetary suit. Implementation 
TBD for HUD vs. voice activated 
being evaluated by ESP/EPSP 3.6.4.1 
10  
The drink bag should have capability to 
contain a high energy liquid in addition 
to plain water 
Requirement 
Modified 
Requirement in HSIR for 
planetary suit 3.5.1.4.1 
H
um
an
 F
ac
to
rs
 
11  
Develop a better in-suit Urine Collection 
Device (UCD) that will work in 1/6 g 
Requirement 
Validated 
Requirement in HSIR, spec's for 
MAG will include improved 
interface. Additional details in 
Level 4 suit documents TBD, 
being evaluated by ExMC and 
ESP/EPSP 3.5.2 
5  
Develop a system that prevents helmet 
fogging during heavy exertion Consider 
Consider Helmet ventilation 
specified in D&C to prevent 
fogging; being evaluated by 
ESP/EPSP  
9  
Use a self-sealing pressure garment 
within the suit for puncture Consider 
Consider HSIR requirement for 
DCS risk reduction Materials 
selection in D&C and level 4 suit 
specs; being evaluated by suit 
engineers and ESP/EPSP  
S
af
et
y 
13  Protect the suit zipper function Consider 
Consider in D&C specs and level 
4 suit specs  
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EMU/EVA ISSUES
Consider, 6, 
34%
Being 
Evaluated, 4, 
24%
New 
Requirement, 
2, 12%
Requirement 
Modified, 1, 
6%
Requirement 
Validated, 3, 
18%
In Practice, 1, 
6%
 
 
LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS 
 
These recommendations revolve around human factors, safety, and operational 
efficiency. Human factors and safety considerations were particularly intertwined 
in this category. A recurrent theme on the lunar surface was an overwhelmingly 
packed schedule. For extended operations, the astronauts were adamant about 
decreasing the workload in the schedule. They suggested a maximum of 2 
LEVAs within a 3 day period and a schedule with flexibility and “breathing room” 
built into it. They also felt that surface operations can begin once operationally 
feasible, that LEVAs should be one continuous event with ample food and liquids 
available before and during the event, and that the schedule should be front-
loaded early on to minimize error and injury. Major risks identified were falls, 
rover operations, and navigating slopes in excess of 20-26°. With suit 
functionality improvement, some of the risks identified will be reduced. To 
increase operational efficiency the astronauts recommended using HUD 
technology, robots for repetitive tasks, and the rover to recharge suits. They also 
felt that for extended operations, LSAM ingress and egress portals must be 
closely scrutinized. They emphasized with a consensus statement that the hatch 
size must comfortably accommodate pressurized suits and that engineers 
consider an airlock. In general, they felt that the familiarization training with 1/6 G 
and analog training was sufficient. 
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This category in particular is very relevant to lunar exploration missions. While 3 
days was the longest any of the astronauts spent on the moon, many of their 
recommendations inferred problem areas for extended lunar stays. Also many of 
their recommendations are straight forward and difficult to counter. For example, 
guarding against overwork and ensuring food and water availability seems 
obvious once it is mentioned, but may not be so clear in planning phases. 
Surprising recommendations included the astronauts’ acknowledgement and 
requests for new technology that one might have thought to be outside of the 
paradigms of these mostly 1960s and 70s era astronauts. Also, multiple 
recommendations have already been implemented by virtue of Shuttle and ISS 
operations.   
  
Table 4: LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS Recommendation Implementation  
LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
14  
Schedule crews for two Lunar EVA 
days on and one day for maintenance, 
alternating crews throughout the week 
Being 
Evaluated 
LAT2 and ARDIG defining 
architecture; to be placed in Ops 
Con document  
16  
An airlock may make ingress/egress 
easier and will also be a good idea from 
a dust control standpoint 
Requirement 
Validated 
Requirement for Airlock in EARD 
and CARD; NESC/LADTAG 
advocating suitlock engineering 
solution for dust mngt.  
22  
Ensure adequate water and food are 
available before and during lunar EVA 
Requirement 
Validated Requirement in HSIR 4.5.1.4 
26  
Plan the operations on the surface so 
that you protect the crews from 
themselves Consider 
Will need Ground and Flight 
Rules to limit  
H
um
an
 F
ac
to
rs
 
28  
A robot should perform routine, 
systematic, repetitive, menial tasks 
(may help prevent repetitive use 
injuries). Consider 
LAT2 surface focus element, 
ARDIG and EVA systems to 
consider  
17  
Surface activities can begin once 
operationally feasible 
Requirement 
Validated 
Ops Con includes surface tasks 
for crew during landing day  
19  
Limit navigation into craters to < 20 - 
26º slope 
Being 
Evaluated 
ARDIG/Ops Con consideration; 
will need a Flight Rule, evaluated 
at planetary analog HMP 2006  
21  
Ladder rung height and width on the 
Lunar Module (LM) were good but the 
glove did not allow adequate grip for 
safety 
Requirement 
Validated 
Revised handhold requirements 
in HSIR  
23  
Lunar EVA should be performed as one 
continuous event 
Requirement 
Validated Ops Con, EVA Con Ops (level 3)  
24  Risk factors for injuries identified:  Consider 
Consider at the level 3&4 SRDs 
and Flight Rules; being 
evaluated by ESP/EPSP and 
ECP  
S
af
et
y 
 a) 
Navigation into sloped terrain or craters 
> 20 - 26º    
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 b) 
Rover activities: CDR, LMP at risk for 
injury if not restrained    
 
 c) 
Falling from a height. The rim of a 
crater, the ladder    
15  
The hatch and ingress corridor should 
be sized appropriately for an inflated 
1/6 g pressure suit 
Requirement 
Validated 
Validated but under threat of 
rejection, weight push backs are 
driving the hatch size closer and 
closer to absolute minimums; for 
LSAM ingress/egress must be 
easy; minimal hatch req’s being 
evaluated by ESP/EPSP  
18  
There is no special training needed for 
1/6 g EVA's other than a familiarization 
session. Consider 
Lunar Crew Operations Training 
Plan, may use POGO or similar 
1/6 G simulator- EPSP 
evaluating  
20  
Crews requested that an automatic 
position determination device be 
available to aid navigation on the lunar 
surface 
Being 
Evaluated 
EPSP evaluating navigation and 
position aids for surface EVA; 
consider for EVA system 
requirements document  
25  
To ensure operational success and 
optimize performance of the crews, 
allow adequate time to practice mission 
activities in a variety of environments 
including analogs that allow preparation 
for off-nominal events In Practice 
Planetary exploration Analog WS 
to be held in March, analog 
management by HQ and ARDIG  
27  
With extended ops on the moon, 
establish all the experiments in the first 
week. Consider 
Will need Ground Rules and put 
Expedition planning guidelines  
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
29  
The Rover should have the ability to 
recharge the suit 
Being 
Evaluated 
LAT2 Surface Ops Focus 
Element evaluating EVA Ops 
trades  
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LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS
Consider, 5, 
31%
Being 
Evaluated, 4, 
25%
Requirement 
Validated, 6, 
38%
In Practice, 1, 
6%
 
INFLIGHT ILLNESSES 
 
This category reflected human factors issues of pain, GI dysfunction, and 
preventative screening. In particular, treatments or preventative measures were 
sought for lower back and forearm pain and soreness, constipation and diarrhea, 
and heart disease. The two consensus statements in this category included 
therapy to relieve muscle soreness, especially in the forearms, and to include a 
physician crewmember to increase the comfort level among the crewmembers. 
This category also demonstrated the inter-disciplinary nature of space 
operations. For example, it was discovered that crewmembers intentionally 
constipated themselves with medications to reduce or completely prevent bowel 
movements. On further questioning it was found that a contributing reason for 
this was the poor waste management collection system. Another example is the 
forearm soreness. With a better designed glove, this complaint is no longer an 
issue. 
 
This category although significant, has less relevance due to Skylab, Shuttle, and 
ISS operations with similar issues Table 3 shows that all issues except the 
consensus related statement regarding a physician-astronaut are accounted for. 
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Table 5: IN-FLIGHT ILLNESS Recommendation Implementation 
IN-FLIGHT ILLNESS 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
30  
Lower back pain should be treated with 
aggressive pre-mission and in-flight core 
strengthening program 
Requirement 
Validated Cx MORD  
31  
Therapy to relieve muscle soreness, 
primarily in the forearms, must be 
available (improved glove design may 
assist this) 
Requirement 
Validated Cx Medical Kit contents definition  
32  
Constipation: improve the waste 
management collection system 
Requirement 
Modified 
Requirement for waste 
management in HSIR 
3.5.3, 
4.5.3 
33  
Screen for CAD prior to selection for 
lunar missions 
Requirement 
Validated 
SFHSD medical standards now 
required for long duration flight  
H
um
an
 F
ac
to
rs
 
35  
Adequate preventive measures and 
treatment for diarrhea must be available 
Requirement 
Validated 
Level of Care in HSIR, Cx 
Medical Kit contents definition 
TBD 3.5.5.5.5 
O
pe
ra
tio
n
s 
34  
A physician crewmember would increase 
the comfort level among the 
crewmembers and can be cross-trained 
to do other activities Consider 
Consider development of Crew 
selection guidelines for Lunar 
Outpost  
 
IN-FLIGHT ILLNESS
Consider, 1, 
17%
Requirement 
Modified, 1, 
17%
Requirement 
Validated, 4, 
66%
 
MEDICATION/MEDICAL KITS 
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Recommendations focused on medications that would have improved 
operational efficiency and comfort. Kit contents requested included allergy 
medications, saline eye drops, standard toiletries (nail clippers, lotions, etc.), 
headache analgesia, efficacious sleep medications, and an efficient 
decongestant delivery system. All of these are currently accounted for or 
improved upon (i.e. including an eyewash in addition to saline drops) in the 
Constellation requirements.  
 
Table 6: MEDICATION/MEDICAL KITS Recommendation Implementation 
MEDICATION/MEDICAL KITS 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
36  
A card in the medical kit to inform the 
crew of the medication duration, 
indication, and interaction with other 
meds is needed 
Requirement 
Validated 
HSIR Level of Care requirement, 
but details in Cx Medical Kit 
contents definition TBD, this will 
be based on Delphi patient care 
database 3.5.5.5.5 
37  
Add non-sedating antihistamines for 
allergy symptoms due to lunar dust 
exposure 
Requirement 
Validated 
Cx Medical Kit contents 
definition TBD  
38  
Saline eye drops need to be available in 
large quantities (however an eyewash 
will be available as part of the 
environmental health kit) 
Requirement 
Validated 
Cx Medical Kit contents 
definition TBD  
39  
Provide items that are needed in daily 
life, e.g. nail clippers, lotions, band-aids, 
etc. (individual hygiene kit will be 
available) 
Requirement 
Validated 
Flight Crew Equipment contents 
definition, currently included in 
long duration flight crew kits for 
ISS  
40  Sufficient analgesia to treat headaches 
Requirement 
Validated 
Cx Medical Kit contents 
definition TBD  
41  
Sleep medication must promote restful 
sleep but not be too sedating 
Requirement 
Validated 
Cx Medical Kit contents 
definition TBD  
C
on
te
nt
s 
42  
An adequate delivery system for nasal 
decongestants must be available for the 
crewmembers 
Requirement 
Validated 
Cx Medical Kit contents 
definition TBD  
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MEDICATION/MEDICAL KITS
Requirement 
Validated, 7, 
100%
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS  
 
Human factors and operational design were the two foci of the Environmental 
Impacts recommendations. Within human factors, recommendations dealt with 
waste management, sleep, and consumables. The astronauts unanimously 
recommended the adaptation of the Skylab waste management system. They 
also wanted to see a device to allow for squatting for bowel movements, felt that 
the Apollo bag aperture and capacity both needed increasing, and would prefer 
that the galley and waste areas be separated. To foster restful sleep, the 
astronauts recommended minimizing environmental noise, having water 
available during sleep, increasing the sleeping bag size to allow for the “fetal 
position”, and the incorporation of the CM sleep restraint system. Hot water 
capability was deemed essential and non-negotiable via a consensus statement.  
A food warmer was also considered desirable. Operational concerns centered on 
engineering redesign, a contingency input, and increasing efficiency. First and 
foremost, the crewmembers consensus was that astronaut participation in design 
and development is essential. Another consensus statement was to incorporate 
more reliable CO2 monitors. They also felt that the LSAM windows should be as 
small as possible and that there should be a system for clearing lunar dust from 
the cabin. A consensus statement born of Apollo 13 was to include thermal 
protective gear in the event of a contingency. The last recommendation was to 
utilize RFID tags for stowage items. 
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The recommendations brought to light some points that would have been missed 
just as they were during Apollo. For example, as a result of the recommendations 
thermal protection is being added to the crew equipment. Other changes and 
additions are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 7: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS Recommendation Implementation 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
43  
Consider adapting the Skylab waste 
management system into the new 
vehicles 
Requirement 
Modified 
Requirement for waste 
management in HSIR 
3.5.3, 
4.5.3 
44  
The sleep restraint system on the Apollo 
CM worked well and should be 
incorporated into the new vehicle design Consider 
Requirement for sleep 
accommodations in HSIR, details 
for Level 4 document TBD 3.5.5.6 
45  
Sleeping bag needs to be large enough 
for crewmembers to get both knees to 
their chest Consider 
Requirement for sleep in HSIR, 
details for sleeping bag at Level 4 
document TBD 3.5.5.6.1 
47  
Portable drinking water should be 
available during sleep periods Consider 
Requirement for potable 
availability at all times in HSIR, 
the details for the portability of 
water will be in a Level 4 
document 4.2.2.2 
48  
Hot water capability for hygiene, 
beverage and food preparation is 
essential 
Requirement 
Validated Requirement in HSIR 3.2.2.3.2 
49  
Apollo bag aperture and capacity needs 
to be larger and easier to apply in 
microgravity Consider 
Contingency waste collection 
requirement in HSIR- details will 
be defined in Cx level 5 spec 
document 
3.5.3, 
4.5.3 
50  
Create a device that would allow 
crewmembers to assume a squatting 
position in microgravity 
Requirement 
Validated 
Requirement in HSIR for WCS 
use restraints 3.4.3.3 
51  
Do not design the galley and waste 
management areas together 
Requirement 
Validated 
Requirement for separation of 
galley and WCS in HSIR 3.5.1.1.1 
52  
Minimize noise but do not eliminate it 
(earplugs are an adequate 
countermeasure for noise) 
Requirement 
Validated Acoustics requirements in HSIR 3.2.6.1 
H
um
an
 F
ac
to
rs
 
54  A food warmer is desirable 
Requirement 
Validated Requirement in HSIR 3.5.1.2.1 
46  
Thermal protective clothing or 
equipment should be available on board Consider 
Level 4, Flight Crew Equipment 
contents definition  
53  
CO2 monitoring device needs to be 
robust and reliable 
Requirement 
Validated Requirement in HSIR 3.2.1.4.1 
55  
Astronaut participation in the design and 
development phases of the new 
vehicles is essential In Practice 
Currently in practice for Cx for 
each vehicle and requirements 
definition.  
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
/E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
56  
Radio Frequency ID tags should be 
considered for stowage items Consider 
Consider for CxP level 4 and 5 
documents- design solutions for 
stowage tracking  
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57  
Lunar Surface Ascent Module (LSAM) 
windows should be designed to see only 
what is necessary for landing and/or 
rendezvous with IR protection 
Being 
Evaluated 
Requirement in HSIR for non-
ionizing radiation exposure, 
consider for LSAM window spec 
Level 5 document 3.2.8.3 
 
58  
Design an efficient method for clearing 
the lunar dust from the vehicle cabin Consider 
HSIR has lunar dust exposure 
limit. Consider for LSAM 
requirements document 3.2.1.6.4 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
Consider, 7, 
44%
Being 
Evaluated, 1, 
6%
Requirement 
Validated, 6, 
38%
In Practice, 1, 
6%
Requirement 
Modified, 1, 6%
RADIATION 
 
Apollo astronauts were concerned about radiation detection and contingency 
plans.  They felt that all vehicles, habitats, and suits should have radiation 
detectors and dosimeters built into them.  They also felt that the rover should 
contain a radiation shield, they should have the ability to create trenches for solar 
particle events, and that pharmacological radiation protectants should be made 
available. 
 
Thanks to Skylab, the shuttle, and the ISS, there is a large body of operational 
knowledge regarding radiation in LEO; however, radiation on the surface of the 
moon is a different entity.  The astronauts were clearly concerned about 
radiation, and more research needs to be done in this area.   
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Table 8: RADIATION Recommendation Implementation 
RADIATION 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
59  
The lunar excursion vehicle should have 
an active radiation detector with an 
automated audible alarm that sounds 
when the dose rate exceeds a 
predetermined level 
Requirement 
Modified 
Requirement in HSIR, recently 
revised under review for EVA; 
req. being developed by ExMC 
and NSBRI 3.5.5.1.5 
D
et
ec
tio
n 
60  
A Personal Radiation Dosimeter is a 
requirement for all crewmembers and 
should be designed into suit garments Consider 
Requirement in HSIR; Need also 
in EVA system and suit 
requirements document 3.2.7 
61  
The rover should be equipped with a 
radiation shield Consider 
Consider for rover requirements 
document and ARDIG Level 2; 
being evaluated by LAT2 surface 
element  
62  
Radiation protectants should be made 
available to the crewmembers 
Being 
Evaluated 
Cx Medical Kit contents definition 
TBD - research not well funded at 
present; some eval by ExMC and 
EPSP  
C
on
tin
ge
nc
y 
63  
Create a trench with shovels or 
explosives to protect the crew short term 
in the event of a Solar Particle Event Consider 
Consider for radiation protection 
Con Ops; alternate strategies 
being evaluated, analogue/HMP 
2007 test item not funded  
 
RADIATION
Consider, 3, 
60%
Being 
Evaluated, 1, 
20%
Requirement 
Modified, 1, 
20%
 
PERFORMANCE/HUMAN FACTORS/CREW SCHEDULE 
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This category generated many recommendations. They can be broken down into 
mental (and physical) health concerns and operational concerns. The mental 
health recommendations dealt with R&R time, sleep, and psychological 
preparation. R&R consensus statements called for 1 day per week for astronaut 
discretionary use and the implementation of mental and physical rest plans. 
Some astronauts also requested recreational activities to be available during 
down time. Interestingly, the astronauts also displayed empathy and concern for 
the workload of the mission control teams in the form of a recommendation. 
Regarding sleep, the astronauts felt that the crew sleep periods should be 
concurrent, that adequate capability for sleep on the lunar surface should be 
provided, and that sleep medication use should not be stigmatized. They also 
unanimously agreed that a minimum of 8 hours per day of sleep and rest must be 
protected. Regarding psychological preparation and well-being, the astronauts 
unanimously agreed that educational and psychological services must be 
available to their families and that if a crewmember dies during the mission, all 
involved must be prepared to “cut them loose”.  
 
Operational concerns overwhelmingly focused on scheduling issues. Crews felt 
that the preflight quarantine was very valuable and that the preflight training 
schedule must allow the crew time to focus on the mission. They also felt that 
throughout the mission including preflight, countermeasures for mental fatigue 
are necessary and that adequate time for activities must always be provided. 
They also recommended that the mission focus be project-oriented and not time-
lined. The final recommendation emphasized the importance of the crew 
authority structure over all other concerns of crew resource management or crew 
composition. 
 
Table 9: PERFORMANCE/HUMAN FACTORS Recommendation Implementation 
PERFORMANCE/HUMAN FACTORS 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
64  
Recreational activities need to be made 
available for crews during Trans Lunar 
Coast and Trans Earth Coast.  CMP 
during lunar surface operations. 
Requirement 
Validated 
Private audio and video 
requirement in HSIR, recreational 
elements under BHP in Cx 
MORD 
3.5.5.1.1 
and .2 
65  
Mental and physical rest plans should be 
introduced into extended moon stays to 
allow adequate rest between lunar EVA Consider Cx Medical kit definition  
67  
Use of sleeping medication should be 
encouraged where appropriate 
Requirement 
Validated 
Cx MORD and Cx Med Kit 
definition TBD  
69  
Education and psychological services 
should be available to the crewmember's 
families 
Requirement 
Validated BHP Requirements in Cx MORD  
M
en
ta
l/P
hy
si
ca
l H
ea
lth
 
71  
Provide adequate capabilities for 
sleeping on the lunar surface Consider 
Details for sleep station in LSAM 
in Level 3 and 4 documents  
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72  
If a crewmember dies during the mission 
you cut him/her loose 
Being 
Evaluated 
Med Code 0 management and 
NASA policy under definition Cx 
MORD and Ops Con  
 
74  
Consider the impact on the mission 
control flight teams and take actions to 
ensure that they are rested and provided 
for during the lunar missions Consider 
Consider for GRnC and MCC 
handbook - TBD  
66  
Mission focus should be project-oriented 
and not timelined Consider 
Need to capture this philosophy 
in Ops Con for lunar outpost 
missions and GRnC TBD  
68  
Countermeasures to combat mental 
fatigue are necessary throughout the 
mission 
Requirement 
Validated Cx Medical kit definition TBD  
70  
Allow adequate time in the schedule for 
all activities Consider Need GRnC entry for this - TBD  O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
73  
In planning crew size/makeup, the 
authority structure is much more 
significant than crew size Consider 
Consider development of Crew 
selection guideline  
 
PERFORMANCE/HUMAN FACTORS
Consider, 6, 
55%
Being 
Evaluated, 1, 
9%
Requirement 
Validated, 4, 
36%
 
 
Table 10: CREW SCHEDULE Recommendation Implementation 
CREW SCHEDULE 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
75  
Preflight quarantine is very valuable 
because it allows time for simulators, 
exercise and rest. Consider 
Need to be built into GRnC and 
crew training plan; CxMORD has 
preflight quarantine requirement 
already  
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
76  
The pre-flight training schedule should 
allow for crews to concentrate on issues 
that will be used for the nominal mission Consider Consider for crew training plan  
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77  
Lunar crews should have one day a week 
for "rest" (freedom to select their activity) Consider Need GRnC entry for this  
78  
An eight hour/day sleep period must be 
protected in the daily schedule and must 
not be compromised Consider Need GRnC entry for this  
M
en
ta
l/P
hy
si
ca
l 
H
ea
lth
 
79  
Crew sleep periods should be scheduled 
at the same time Consider Need GRnC entry for this  
 
 
CREW SCHEDULE
Consider, 5, 
100%
 
 
EXERCISE 
 
Recommendations regarding exercise centered on scheduling concerns and the 
exercise equipment. While they felt that exercise isn’t required on trips < 14 days  
from a strength/endurance perspective  and that exercise prescriptions for short 
trips were likewise not necessary, they unanimously felt that the availability must 
exist to exercise for R&R during all phases of the mission. They felt exercise is 
required for longer duration lunar missions. They also felt that scheduling needs 
to allocate time for preflight conditioning and that a preflight and in-flight forearm 
conditioning program be included. The Exer-Genie on Apollo missions was 
considered sub-par, and the astronauts unanimously felt that new exercise 
devices should be reliable, simple, and safe. They also encouraged that as much 
exercise variety is built into the vehicle and equipment as possible. 
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Table 11: EXERCISE Recommendation Implementation 
EXERCISE 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
80  
Loosen the pre-mission timeline to 
allow adequate time for pre-flight 
conditioning program Consider 
Need to be built into GRnC and 
crew training plan; CxMORD has 
preflight conditioning as does the 
Space Flight Health Document  
82  
The flight surgeon/mission planners 
should not plan specific exercise 
prescriptions for short duration (< 14 
days) mission 
Being 
Evaluated 
Not consistent with SA position 
(we say  < 8 days).; HSIR 
requirement for exercise for all 
missions > 8 days. 3.5.4.1.1 
83  
Exercise is not necessary on short trips 
(14 days or less) [from a fitness 
standpoint], however crews demanded 
that the capability be available and 
varied as much as possible for crew 
"rest and relaxation" in all phases of the 
mission 
Requirement 
Modified 
Not completely consistent with 
current requirement; HSIR 
requirement to begin exercise as 
soon as practical 3.5.4.1.1 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
-S
ch
ed
ul
in
g 
84  
Develop a better pre-flight and in-flight 
forearm muscle conditioning program 
for lunar crewmembers 
Requirement 
Modified 
CxMORD preflight conditioning; 
ASCR pre-flight prep document to 
be revised from current ISS 
document for exploration missions. 
Strength/endurance requirements 
for mission tasks being developed 
by ECP  
81  
A more robust (and lightweight) piece 
of in-flight exercise equipment is 
needed than the Apollo Exer-Genie 
Requirement 
Validated 
Requirement in HSIR; Need h/w 
spec definition at level 4 and 5 
under evaluation by ECP 3.5.4.1.1 
85  
New vehicle design should allow a 
variety of different exercise capabilities 
(hardware vs. cabin structure) 
Requirement 
Modified 
Requirement in HSIR; need 
outpost exercise requirements in 
Level 3 Lunar Outpost 
Requirements 3.5.4.1.1 
86  
Put as many [exercise] capabilities in 
the vehicle as possible, because it will 
get used Consider 
Need outpost exercise guidelines 
in Level 3 Outpost Requirements; 
Lunar Habitat Team earmarking 
exercise area in habitat. H/w under 
eval by ECP  E
ng
in
ee
rin
g-
E
qu
ip
m
en
t 
87  
New exercise device should be reliable, 
simple and not develop excessive heat 
in use 
Requirement 
Modified 
Requirement in HSIR; Need h/w 
spec definition at level 4 and 5, 
being evaluated by ECP 3.5.4.2.1 
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EXERCISE
Consider, 2, 
25%
Being 
Evaluated, 1, 
13%Requirement 
Modified, 4, 
49%
Requirement 
Validated, 1, 
13%
 
FOOD/NUTRITION 
  
This category resulted in a surprising number of recommendations. The 
astronauts commented on nutritional requirements, taste preferences, logistics, 
and operations. The astronauts unanimously agreed that mission activity dictates 
the type and amount of food that will be consumed. They also were unanimous in 
recommending ample water availability for LEVAs and felt that an in suit source 
of carbohydrates would be helpful. They felt that for long duration missions diet 
and food intake would need to be carefully optimized.  Regarding food flavor they 
preferred spicy and salty foods and suggested research into how different 
environmental factors affect food flavor. They unanimously agreed that ops 
needs to schedule adequate time for food and also would like to see the new 
vehicle allocate space and areas to store food packs during meals.   
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Table 12: FOOD/NUTRITION Recommendation Implementation 
FOOD/NUTRITION 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
88  
Mission activity (e.g. coast, rendezvous, 
lunar orbit, lunar ops) will dictate what 
type and how much food will be 
consumed.                                                   
High Activity: wet packages, bite-sized 
snacks, canned foods 
Low Activity:  spoon bowls, dry juice or 
meals (rehydratable) requiring mixing, 
etc. 
Requirement 
Modified 
Nutrition requirements in HSIR; 
CxMORD; Need food system 
requirements at level 4 and 5 
3.5.1.3.1  
3.5.1.3.2 
89  
Plain water in large quantities needs to 
be available for lunar EVA 
Requirement 
Validated Requirement in HSIR 3.2.2.2.1 
90  
Optimize diet and food intake for overall 
performance during long duration 
missions 
Requirement 
Validated Requirement in HSIR 
3.5.1.3.1  
3.5.1.3.2 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
91  
An in-suit non-caffeinated solid or liquid 
carbohydrate food source for lunar EVA 
would be helpful. 
Being 
Evaluated 
Under evaluation by EPSP and 
ExMC  
E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
92  
Design adequate space an useful area in 
the new vehicles to store food packs 
during meals Consider 
Stowage requirement in HSIR, 
Level 4 requirements needed for 
food system details being 
evaluated by Food Science Lab 3.5.6 
93  
Spicy and salty foods are preferred items 
in the menu Consider 
Food system requirement at 
level 4 and 5  
P
al
at
e 
95  
Determine how different environmental 
factors (e.g. O2 concentration, cabin 
pressure) effect food flavor Consider Need research topic for HRP  
O
ps
 
94  
Allow adequate time in the daily schedule 
for meals Consider Need GRnC entry for this  
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FOOD/NUTRITION
Consider, 4, 
49%
Being 
Evaluated, 1, 
13%
Requirement 
Modified, 1, 
13%
Requirement 
Validated, 2, 
25%
 
LAUNCH, LANDING, AND RECOVERY OPS 
 
This category could be broken down into discussions regarding a sea recovery, 
operations, and engineering ergonomic concerns. Many of the astronauts 
discouraged ground landings and felt that cooling capability on landing was 
required to mitigate sea sickness. They also felt that food and water must be 
within reach of buckled crew members for delayed recoveries. Additionally, they 
stated that the Apollo seats were adequate for water landings and the 
medications for motion sickness and fatigue should be available prior to re-entry. 
Operationally, they wanted to see a flight rule to limit sea state landings to <6-8 
foot swells if recovery is to be delayed. They also felt that the crew surgeon best 
fulfills his duty from the recovery vessel not the helicopter. Training for pad aborts 
were thought to be adequate. Regarding engineering ergonomics the astronauts 
felt that the CM hatch location and size were adequate and that all switches and 
panels should be reachable during launch and landing. 
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Table 13: LAUNCH, LANDING, AND RECOVERY OPS Recommendation 
Implementation 
LAUNCH, LANDING, AND RECOVERY OPS 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
96  
Provide adequate cooling capabilities 
for the crew on landing to mitigate the 
hot cabin contribution to crewmember 
sea sickness 
Being 
Evaluated 
Cabin environment requirement 
in HSIR; 36 hr post-landing 
tiger team working details of 
ECLSS, suit, etc. need CR to 
CEV SRD 3.2.3.1.2 
97  Ground landings discouraged 
Being 
Evaluated 
Land vs. water tiger team 
weighing trades  
98  
Apollo seat configuration for water 
landings were adequate:  the restraint 
system needs to include loose 
equipment items 
Requirement 
Validated 
Seat requirements in HSIR; 
CEV SRD (previously in crew 
cockpit document) 
3.4.2.6; 
3.3.2.3 
Se
a 
R
ec
ov
er
y 
99  
Medication for motion sickness and 
fatigue will be available prior to re-entry 
Requirement 
Validated 
CxMORD; Medical Ops Con 
and Crew Medication Kit 
definition TBD  
100  
Sea state should be limited to < 6-8 foot 
swells if recovery is to be delayed Consider 
CEV SRD defines sea state for 
vehicle; Ground Ops con 
defines recovery strategy  
104  
Training for pad abort was adequate 
and should be continued Consider 
Need to include in crew training 
plan  
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
105  
Crew surgeon should be on the 
recovery vessel and not the helicopter 
Requirement 
Modified 
Ops Con, Cx MORD, and Med 
Ops Con  
101  
Have food and plain water within reach 
of buckled crewmembers for delayed 
recovery Consider 
Need to add requirement to 
HSIR and CEV SRD and 36 
hour post-survival Tiger Team  
102 a) 
Apollo Command Module hatch location 
and size was adequate for egress 
Requirement 
Validated 
Hatch requirements in HSIR, 
vehicle specific hatch 
dimension in SRD 3.4.4 
 b) 
Hatch should open outward and seal 
with pressure Consider 
Hatch requirements in HSIR 
Level 3 and 4 requirements for 
hatch operation details TBD 3.4.4 E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
103  
All control panels and switches should 
be within reach of crewmembers during 
launch and landing 
Requirement 
Validated 
Cockpit requirements in HSIR; 
CEV SRD and Crew Cockpit 
document 3.6.3.2.2 
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LAUNCH, LANDING, AND RECOVERY OPS
Consider, 4, 37%
Being Evaluated, 2, 
18%
Requirement 
Modified, 1, 9%
Requirement 
Validated, 4, 36%
 
FLIGHT SURGEON-CREW INTERACTION 
 
The crews felt that the Flight Surgeon must act as an advocate for the crew and 
that the collaboration born of this study between the Flight Surgeons and the 
Apollo astronauts should continue and be an example to future generations. 
 
Table 14: FLIGHT SURGEON-CREW INTERACTION Recommendation 
Implementation 
FLIGHT SURGEON-CREW INTERACTION 
Cat #  Apollo Recommendation Summary Status Disposition Reference 
106  
Crew encouraged FS to "act as more of 
an advocate of the crew" than treat them 
as an experiment In Practice Currently in practice  
R
es
ou
rc
e 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
107  
The collaboration established between 
the current flight surgeons and Apollo 
crewmembers should continue and be an 
example to future generations Consider Roger and concur  
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FLIGHT SURGEON-CREW INTERACTION
Consider, 1, 50%In Practice, 1, 50%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, we see that the 107 recommendations break down as follows: 
Category Number of 
Recommendations
Percentage
Consider 44 39% 
Being Evaluated 15 13% 
New Requirement 2 2% 
Requirement Modified 10 9% 
Requirement Validated 37 33% 
Rejected 0 0% 
In Practice 4 4% 
Totals: 112 100% 
Note that a few recommendations that the Apollo astronauts made were broken 
down into multiple recommendations and hence there was 112 resultant data 
points analyzed as opposed to 107. In the table we see that 48% of the 
recommendations validated, revised, or created new requirements or are 
currently in practice, and 52% are being considered or evaluated.  Of this 52%, 
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there is potential for requirements being further modified, validated, or created.  
Hence, we see that many of the experiences of the Apollo Astronauts have been 
considered relevant, and have impacted the exploration architecture.  
 
Figure 2: Overall status of the Apollo suggestions 
Status of the Apollo Astronaut Suggestions
Being Evaluated, 15, 
13%New Requirement, 2, 
2%
Requirement 
Modified, 10, 9%
Requirement 
Validated, 37, 33%
Rejected, 0, 0%
In Practice, 4, 4%
Consider, 44, 39%
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Conclusion 
 
The Apollo Medical Operations Project was undertaken to identify Apollo mission 
issues relevant to medical operations that had an impact on crew health and/or 
performance. The goals of this project were to develop or modify medical 
requirements for new vehicles and habitats, create a centralized database for 
future access, and share relevant Apollo information with the various entities at 
NASA and abroad participating in the exploration effort.  Secondary objectives 
included using this information to validate current requirements and refresh 
knowledge regarding lunar operations. 
 
The theme of the Apollo astronaut’s 107 recommendations is res ipsa loquitur or 
“the thing speaks for itself.” As one of the astronauts said, “start with what 
worked on Apollo, and then prove to me why something should be different.”  
The authors likewise feel that the information gleaned from Apollo’s operational 
experiences are relevant even though the exploration missions have different 
objectives than say “Apollo 18” These recommendations have broad implications 
for mission directors, engineers, astronauts, physicians, administrators, and 
anyone involved in exploration missions. To date organizations within the Life 
Sciences Directorate such as the Human Research Program HRP have taken 
action on many of the recommendations to develop operational solutions to 
impacts Apollo identified during their missions. The HRP has funded specific 
programs, such as the EVA Physiology and Performance Project (EPSP), 
Exploration Medical Capabilities (ExMC) and Exercise Countermeasures 
Program (ECP) to develop hardware or systems based on the Apollo Medical 
Operations Project results.  It is important to point out that the EPSP members 
are currently contributing to the Lunar Architecture Team (LAT) phase 2 study 
surface and habitat focus elements in addressing the issues related to crew 
habitat concerns, airlocks/suitlocks, radiation protection, EVA navigation and 
guidance, suit design and operations, etc. 
 
It is the authors’ vision that the recommendations be evaluated by all relevant 
departments. Also, it is hoped that appropriate recommendations become 
requirements and go on to improve mission operations. Currently, 48% of the 
recommendations have created, modified, or validated requirements or are in 
practice, 52% are being considered or evaluated, and 0% have been rejected. It 
is incumbent on all who read the paper to keep the 52% from falling by the waste 
side.   
 
Further work in this area may include additional follow-up or perhaps an ongoing 
dialogue with the Apollo astronauts to garner their opinions regarding mission 
operations and implementation of their recommendations. Looking towards the 
future, with operationally driven outcomes derived from studies such as The 
Apollo Medical Operations Project, the hope is that humankind will be one step 
closer to the Constellation goal of exploring the moon, Mars, and beyond. 
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